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Explicit Consent-By-Registration: Plaintiffs’ New 
Hope After the “At Home” Trilogy 
Chris Carey* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court recently added another decision to 
what is now a trilogy of cases that together upend decades of settled 
personal jurisdiction precedent.1  With its opinions in Goodyear, 
Daimler, and Tyrrell, the Court expressed renewed interest in an issue 
ordinarily receiving little space on the Court’s crowded docket: general 
personal jurisdiction.2  The trilogy cases replace the Court’s traditional 
“minimum contacts” analysis for general jurisdiction with an “at home” 
rule.3  The at home rule states that, absent exceptional circumstances, 
courts may only subject corporations to general jurisdiction in their state 
of incorporation and principal place of business.4  The at home rule 
significantly narrows the scope of general jurisdiction, arming corporate 
defendants with a new weapon in their pre-trial arsenals and sending the 
plaintiffs’ bar in search of alternative jurisdictional theories.5  One such 
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 1.    See, e.g., Ryan N. Parsons, BNSF Railway: SCOTUS Narrows General Jurisdiction for 
Corporate Defendants and Limits the Reach of Wisconsin’s Long-Arm Statute, WIS. APP. L. (June 5, 
2017), https://www.wiappellatelaw.com/2017/06/05/bnsf-railway-scotus-narrows-general-jurisdict 
ion-for-corporate-defendants-and-limits-the-reach-of-wisconsins-long-arm-statute/ [https://perma.cc 
/932U-UDAK] (discussing the three recent general jurisdiction cases as having “redefined the limits 
of constitutional due process”). 
 2.   Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); Daimler AG v. 
Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014); BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017).  Before 2011, the 
Court had only decided two general jurisdiction cases, Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 
342 U.S. 437 (1952) and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).  
See Jack B. Harrison, Registration, Fairness, and General Jurisdiction, 95 NEB. L. REV. 477, 490–
95 (2016) (discussing the Court’s two general jurisdiction cases after International Shoe).  
 3.   See Harrison, supra note 2, at 507 (“[Goodyear and Daimler] radically transformed the 
traditional understanding of general jurisdiction. . . . [and] injected a far more categorical and 
restrictive approach . . . than seen in any of its prior jurisprudence.”).  
 4.    Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137.  
 5.   See Harrison, supra note 2, at 507–08 (“[W]ith the narrowing of . . . general 
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theory, increasingly relied on by plaintiffs in the wake of the at home 
trilogy, is consent-by-registration.6 
Consent-by-registration is the idea that a corporation submits itself to 
general jurisdiction in a state by registering to do business in that state in 
compliance with a registration statute.7  The appeal of consent-by-
registration to plaintiffs is readily apparent, as every state requires 
foreign corporations to register before conducting any business.8  Before 
the at home trilogy, lower courts were divided on whether consent-by-
registration satisfied the Supreme Court’s constitutional due process 
requirements for personal jurisdiction.9  After the trilogy, however, lower 
courts have increasingly rejected consent-by-registration as offending 
due process.10  Although the tide is turning against consent-by-
                                                            
jurisdiction . . . in Daimler, the natural next step for plaintiffs is to seek other grounds for general 
jurisdiction . . . .” (quotations omitted)); Norman H. Pentelovitch, Everyone’s Favorite Legal Issue, 
MINN. LAW. (July 27, 2017), http://minnlawyer.com/2017/07/27/everyones-favorite-legal-issue/ 
[https://perma.cc/TU88 
-WMCU] (“A trio of recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions has progressively narrowed the 
application of general personal jurisdiction.”).  
 6.   See Harrison, supra note 2, at 508 (stating that the most obvious place [for plaintiffs’] to 
look for new general jurisdiction theories is consent-by-registration (quotation omitted) (quoting 
Charles W. Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward A New Equilibrium in Personal 
Jurisdiction, 48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 260 (2014))).  
 7.   Because this Comment focuses on general jurisdiction, the phrase “consent-by-
registration” refers only to situations where consent is applied to establish general jurisdiction.  See 
Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *3 (D. Del. Feb. 
26, 2015) (discussing the plaintiff’s “consent-by-registration” argument that a corporation “could 
validly consent to personal jurisdiction through compliance with . . . a state registration statute”); see 
also Harrison, supra note 2, at 516–38 (examining cases after Daimler accepting and rejecting 
“consent-by-registration”).   
  Although this Comment uses the phrase consent-by-registration, it should be noted that 
many courts and legal commentators use other phrases with the same meaning.  See Genuine Parts 
Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 136 (Del. 2016) (using “consent-based general jurisdiction” and 
“consent by registration”); Tanya J. Monestier, Registration Statutes, General Jurisdiction, and the 
Fallacy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1343, 1347 (2015) (“registration-based general 
jurisdiction”); Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 6, at 258 (“consent-based general jurisdiction”). 
 8.   See generally Kevin D. Benish, Note, Pennoyer’s Ghost: Consent, Registration Statutes, 
and General Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1609 app. (2015) 
(compiling every state’s business registration statute and the consequences of registration in terms of 
personal jurisdiction). 
  The term “foreign corporation” in this Comment refers to any business not incorporated in a 
given state.  A similar use of the term appears in the Supreme Court’s recent general jurisdiction 
cases.  See, e.g., Daimler, 571 U.S. at 127 (defining a “foreign” corporation as a “sister-state or 
foreign-country” corporation (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 
915, 919 (2011))). 
 9.    See Harrison, supra note 2, at 512–16 (collecting the divided decisions of lower courts 
before Daimler on the issue of consent-by-registration). 
 10.   Aspen Am. Ins. v. Interstate Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440, 445, 447 (Ill. 2017) 
(rejecting an interpretation of Illinois’ registration statute that would subject foreign corporations to 
general jurisdiction as inconsistent with due process after Tyrrell); Segregated Account of Ambac 
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registration in lower courts, conflicting opinions make the issue ripe for 
consideration by the Supreme Court.11 
When the issue inevitably reaches the Supreme Court, the Court 
should defy expectations and hold that consent-by-registration comports 
with due process even after the at home trilogy.  Part II of this Comment 
details the historical development of both general jurisdiction and 
consent-by-registration, reviewing the split authority among lower courts 
deciding consent-by-registration cases before and after the at home 
trilogy.  Part III then develops an explicit consent approach to satisfy the 
fairness concerns of the plaintiffs’ bar while also furthering the principles 
of the at home trilogy.  Section III.A examines the arguments typically 
relied on by courts invalidating consent-by-registration and explains why 
these arguments do not apply to an explicit consent approach.  Section 
III.B then submits that the Court never overturned its prior cases 
sanctioning consent-by-registration and argues that explicit consent 
continues to comport with due process after the at home trilogy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Before developing an explicit consent approach to consent-by-
registration, it is necessary to examine existing approaches to consent-
by-registration and the personal jurisdiction principles that govern them.  
This section provides a brief synopsis of the development of the general 
jurisdiction doctrine as it relates to business registration statutes and 
consent.  First, Section II.A traces the evolution of the general 
jurisdiction doctrine over time by examining the Supreme Court’s 
canonical opinions on the subject.  Second, Section II.B introduces 
                                                            
Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 N.W.2d 70, 76–79 (Wis. 2017) (same 
regarding a Wisconsin statute). 
 11.    See Michael Huston, Sean Cooksey & David Casazza, ‘Consent’ is the next big battle over 
personal jurisdiction, S.F. DAILY J. (July 5, 2017), https://www.gibsondunn.com/wp-
content/uploads/documents/publications/Huston-Cooksey-Casazza-Consent-is-the-next-big-battle-
over-personal-jurisdiction-DJ-7-5-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5CB7-PJCJ]; Gregg L. Weiner & 
Adam M. Harris, ‘Consent by Registration’ Theory of Jurisdiction: Are Its Days Numbered?, N.Y. 
L.J. (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/almID/1202773180774/consent-by-
registration-theory-of-jurisdiction-are-its-days-numbered/?back=law [https://perma.cc/WR3Y-
YWJ2] (discus 
sing conflicting opinions among lower state and federal courts, and the potential for Supreme Court 
resolution of the issue); James J. Dries, BNSF and the Continuing Clarification of General Personal 
Jurisdiction, BAKER MCKENZIE (June 5, 2017), http://www.bakermckenzie.com/en 
/insight/publications/2017/06/bnsf-general-personal-jurisdiction/ (“[I]n the aftermath of Goodyear 
and Daimler, the issue of consent jurisdiction has generated considerable debate in US courts, with 
inconsistent results . . . . This debate will continue until resolved by the US Supreme Court.  Given 
the deep divisions that have arisen on this issue, it is reasonable to expect that the issue will soon 
come before the high court for review.”). 
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business registration statutes and their effect on personal jurisdiction, and 
later discusses the split authority among lower courts as to whether 
consent-by-registration comports with the due process requirements of 
general jurisdiction. 
A.  The Court Awakens: General Jurisdiction Through the At Home 
Trilogy 
A court must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant before it 
can issue binding decisions on the merits.12  Operating as a restriction on 
the exercise of judicial power, personal jurisdiction recognizes a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest of the defendant under the Due 
Process Clause.13  The Supreme Court’s early cases adopted a territorial 
view of judicial authority in which state courts only exercised personal 
jurisdiction over persons and property physically present within their 
borders.14  A territorial view of personal jurisdiction premised on state 
sovereignty prevailed until 1945, when the Court issued its seminal 
opinion on personal jurisdiction in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington.15  After International Shoe, the Court’s personal jurisdiction 
cases proceeded in two phases.  In the first phase, two categories of 
personal jurisdiction emerged, and the Court permitted the vast 
expansion of general jurisdiction.  In the second phase, the Court 
narrowed the test for general jurisdiction with its opinions in the at home 
trilogy cases.  The remainder of this section traces the ebb and flow of 
general jurisdiction by discussing each phase separately. 
                                                            
 12.   Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577 (1999) (“Jurisdiction to resolve cases 
on the merits requires both authority over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) 
and authority over the parties (personal jurisdiction), so that the court’s decision will bind them.”); 4 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1063 (4th ed. 2015) (“A 
federal court may not proceed to a valid judgment in the absence of [personal jurisdiction] . . . .”). 
 13.   Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982); see B. 
Travis Brown, Salvaging General Jurisdiction: Satisfying Daimler and Proposing a New 
Framework, 3 BELMONT L. REV. 187, 189 (2016) (“Jurisdiction is essentially the power of a court 
over persons and things.  More specifically, personal jurisdiction is defined as a court’s power to 
bring a person into its adjudicative process.” (internal quotations and citations omitted)). 
  The Court first linked the personal jurisdiction requirements with the Due Process Clause in 
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733–34 (1877).  See Harrison, supra note 2, at 483 (“[T]he critical 
analysis in Pennoyer rested upon linking the concept of personal jurisdiction with the constitutional 
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); Benish, supra note 8, at 1615 
(“[P]ennoyer established the connection between personal jurisdiction and the Due Process 
Clause.”). 
 14.    Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 720; Harrison, supra note 2, at 484 (describing an analysis “based on 
a defendant’s physical presence and the territorial sovereignty of the states” as forming “the linchpin 
of courts’ application of . . . personal jurisdiction” in the years following Pennoyer). 
 15.   326 U.S. 310 (1945).  
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1. Phase One: The Expansion of General Jurisdiction 
The rapid industrialization of the United States economy at the turn 
of the twentieth century presented challenges for the territorial view of 
personal jurisdiction.16  Courts struggled to adapt the territorial view, 
which grounded personal jurisdiction on a defendant’s physical presence 
in one state, with the reality that corporations were increasingly 
conducting business in more than one state.17  International Shoe directly 
addressed this tension between the realities of the new American 
economy and the territorial approach to personal jurisdiction. 
In International Shoe, the Court pivoted from the territorial approach 
to personal jurisdiction to an analysis centered on the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state.18  International Shoe involved a suit in 
Washington against a Delaware corporation with its principal place of 
business in Missouri.19  Under the territorial view, the corporation 
claimed it was not present in Washington, and thus not subject to 
personal jurisdiction in Washington.20  The State of Washington, 
however, argued that Washington courts could exercise personal 
jurisdiction based on the corporation’s in-state business activity.21  The 
Court affirmed Washington’s exercise of personal jurisdiction and 
shifted the personal jurisdiction analysis away from physical presence 
and towards the relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the 
                                                            
 16.   See Edward D. Cavanagh, General Jurisdiction 2.0: The Updating and Uprooting of the 
Corporate Presence Doctrine, 68 ME. L. REV. 287, 290–91 (2016) (highlighting the invention of the 
automobile and accelerated pace of urbanization as “underscor[ing] the inadequacies of the common 
law’s restrictive approach to personal jurisdiction”); Gwynne L. Skinner, Expanding General 
Personal Jurisdiction Over Transnational Corporations For Federal Causes of Action, 121 PENN 
ST. L. REV. 617, 627 (2017) (comparing the ease of exercising jurisdiction over corporations under 
the territorial view in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the difficulties of applying the 
territorial view in the industrialized twentieth century where corporations increasingly did business 
in many states). 
 17.    See Harrison, supra note 2, at 484 (“As modern commerce developed in the twentieth 
century, business entities increasingly engaged in commerce in multiple states, including many states 
in which the business had no ‘presence’ as that concept had been articulated in Pennoyer.”). 
 18.    Id. at 485 (observing the Court’s movement in International Shoe beyond Pennoyer’s 
“rigid requirement of physical presence” and articulation of “a new definition of ‘presence’” 
premised on minimum contacts); Monestier, supra note 7, at 1349 (“[International Shoe] marked a 
shift away from the territoriality approach to jurisdiction that prevailed under Pennoyer . . . and 
ushered in a new era whereby minimum contacts became the touchstone of personal jurisdiction.”); 
Benish, supra note 8, at 1616–17 (detailing the shift from due process limited by “the territorial 
borders of each state” under Pennoyer and towards due process limited by the defendant’s in-state 
minimum contacts under International Shoe). 
 19.   International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 312–13. 
 20.    See id. at 315–16. 
 21.   See id. at 313–15. 
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litigation.22 
The International Shoe Court created a new “minimum contacts” test 
for determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a 
nonresident corporation comports with due process: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant 
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the 
territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it 
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’23 
In the decades following International Shoe, two categories of 
personal jurisdiction emerged: general and specific.24  A court may 
exercise specific jurisdiction when the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to 
the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”25  Alternatively, a court may 
exercise general jurisdiction when a corporation’s operations in the 
forum state are “so substantial and of such a nature as to justify 
suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct 
from those activities.”26  Because this Comment focuses on consent-by-
registration as a means of establishing general jurisdiction, the remainder 
of this section will examine the Court’s general jurisdiction cases after 
International Shoe. 
The Court decided only two general jurisdiction cases in the post-
International Shoe era before the at home trilogy—Perkins and 
Helicopteros.27  In those two cases, the Court required that a corporation 
                                                            
 22.   See id. at 319–20. 
 23.    Id. at 316 (emphasis added) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 24.   The distinction between general and specific jurisdiction first appeared in a law review 
article by two Harvard University professors.  See Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (describing 
unlimited and limited general jurisdiction).  The Court first recognized and adopted von Mehren and 
Trautman’s general and specific distinction in two consecutive footnotes in Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall.  See 466 U.S. 408, 414 nn.8–9 (1984). 
 25.    Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 
Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 414 n.8) (internal quotations omitted). 
 26.   Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318). 
 27.   The Court noted this trend towards specific jurisdiction in Daimler before summarizing the 
Court’s two general jurisdiction cases.  Id. at 128–31.  In the first general jurisdiction case, Perkins 
v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., the Court examined a corporation’s contacts in Ohio to 
determine if they were sufficient to satisfy due process.  342 U.S. 437, 445–46 (1952).  The Court 
searched for “continuous and systematic” activities in Ohio that were “so substantial and of such a 
nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from 
those activities.”  Id. (quoting International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).  Because the defendant’s Ohio 
contacts met that standard, the Court held that Ohio’s exercise of general jurisdiction did not offend 
due process.  Id. at 447–48.  In the second general jurisdiction case, Helicopteros, the Court denied 
general jurisdiction in Texas after counting up all of the corporate defendant’s contacts in Texas and 
 
2018 EXPLICIT CONSENT-BY-REGISTRATION 201 
have “continuous and systematic general business contacts” in a forum 
before being subjected to general jurisdiction.28  The Court’s two general 
jurisdiction cases involved vastly different facts, and provided lower 
courts with little guidance regarding what kinds of business contacts in a 
state would satisfy the Court’s contacts test.29  Lower courts during this 
period counted the corporate defendant’s business activity in a forum in 
search of “continuous and systematic” contacts.30  Courts considered a 
wide menu of business activities in their search for continuous and 
systematic contacts, although the weight assigned to any given activity 
varied by jurisdiction.31  Lacking further clarification on how to evaluate 
corporate business contacts, lower courts vastly expanded the scope of 
general jurisdiction.32  The vast expansion of available forums under 
International Shoe’s contacts-based approach prevailed until Goodyear, 
the first installment of the at home trilogy. 
2. Phase Two: The At Home Trilogy 
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,33 the Court 
began narrowing the scope of general jurisdiction.34  Goodyear involved 
                                                            
determining that they were not sufficiently continuous and systematic to satisfy the minimum 
contacts analysis.  466 U.S. at 415–18. 
 28.   Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416 (1984) (referencing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445). 
 29.   Patrick J. Borchers, The Problem with General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 
125 (2001) (observing that the Court’s cases did not give “clear legal rules for contacts-based 
general jurisdiction”); Stanley E. Cox, The Missing “Why” of General Jurisdiction, 76 U. PITT. L. 
REV. 153, 158–59, 161–62 (2014) (arguing that the “vague and questionable” nature of the 
“continuous and systematic” business contacts test created confusion in lower courts); Richard D. 
Freer, Some Specific Concerns with the New General Jurisdiction, 15 NEV. L.J. 1161, 1166 (2015) 
(describing Perkins and Helicopteros as “nearly polar opposites on the scale of business activity in 
the forum” and explaining that “lower courts [have] wrestled with individual cases that presented 
much closer questions, without guidance from the Court.”). 
 30.    See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1352 n.45 (2015). 
 31.   Lower courts during this era considered a variety of activities, such as “whether a 
corporation had a place of business in the forum, whether it had employees in the forum, whether it 
advertised to residents in the forum, its volume of sales in the forum, and so on.”  Id. at 1352.  
However, courts did not balance these types of activities in the same way, which “meant that courts 
would come to different conclusions on whether they had general jurisdiction over defendants.”  Id. 
at 1352–53. 
 32.   See id. at 1353–54. 
 33.    564 U.S. 915 (2011).   
 34.   Monestier, supra note 7, at 1354 (describing Goodyear as “a case that ultimately marked 
the beginning of the end for doing business jurisdiction”); Benish, supra note 8, at 1618 (regarding 
Goodyear’s reference to an “at home” test and focus on domicile, place of incorporation, and 
principal place of business as a “preview of the new era Daimler would usher in”); Craig Sanders, 
Note, Of Carrots and Sticks: General Jurisdiction and Genuine Consent, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1323, 
1327 (2017) (noting the Court’s use of “essentially at home” in Goodyear as a “seemingly innocuous 
phrase tighten[ing] the reins on future general jurisdiction analyses”). 
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a wrongful death claim filed in North Carolina by the parents of two 
boys killed in a bus accident in France against the Goodyear Tire 
Company and several of its foreign subsidiaries.35  The Goodyear 
subsidiaries’ only contact was the exportation of a small percentage of 
their tires into the North Carolina market through the “stream of 
commerce.”36  The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the exercise 
of general jurisdiction over the foreign subsidiaries because they 
manufactured products that eventually ended up in North Carolina, and 
therefore satisfied International Shoe’s minimum contacts test.37 
The United States Supreme Court rejected North Carolina’s stream 
of commerce approach to general jurisdiction.38  The Court first stated 
that the appropriate general jurisdiction forum for individuals is their 
place of domicile, whereas for corporations, “it is an equivalent place, 
one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at home.”39  The Court 
then identified the place of incorporation and principal place of business 
as paradigm examples of a corporation’s home forum.40  Because the 
                                                            
 35.   Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 918.  The parents in the case argued that the bus’s tires were 
defective and named as defendants the parent corporation—Goodyear USA, an Ohio corporation 
which did not contest general jurisdiction in North Carolina—and three of Goodyear USA’s foreign 
subsidiaries.  Id. at 920–21.  The Goodyear subsidiaries were incorporated and held their principal 
places of business outside the United States.  Id. 
 36.   Id. at 921. 
 37.   Id. at 926. 
 38.    Id. at 929. 
 39.    Id. at 924 (emphasis added). 
 40.   Id.  The Court listed these “paradigm examples” in a parenthetical, but it did not clarify if 
these were the only forums where courts should consider corporations “at home” or whether the 
Court intended the at home inquiry to replace International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis.  
  Legal commentators were critical of the Court’s failure to clearly articulate the meaning of 
the at home inquiry in Goodyear.  See Cox, supra note 29, at 167 (arguing that “it was hardly clear 
how much . . . might be required to make a corporation ‘at home’” and that the Court “failed to 
provide clear rules or a deeper explanation for what lay behind the ‘at home’ gloss”); Meir Feder, 
Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 
672 (2012) (debating the effects of Goodyear and noting that, given the significant implications of 
the new at home test, some commentators argued “[the implications] cannot have been intended—
that the Court’s apparent restriction of general jurisdiction . . . should be dismissed as ‘loose 
language,’ and that Goodyear should be limited to its ‘particular facts’”); Harrison, supra note 2, at 
499 (“The Court in Goodyear did not expressly limit general jurisdiction to a corporation’s state of 
incorporation or its principal place of business.”); Monestier, supra note 7, at 1355 (indicating that 
“[c]learly, the ‘at home’ language was intended to mean something,” but that legal scholars and 
courts were unsure if the Court “intended to make a sweeping change to general jurisdiction with 
just [those] two words”); Kaitlin Hanigan, Comment, A Blunder of Supreme Proportions: General 
Jurisdiction After Daimler AG v. Bauman, 48 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 291, 296 (2014) (arguing that 
although the Goodyear Court established a new “at home” standard, “the Court did not entirely flesh 
out the concept” or provide guidance to lower courts because the Court “suggested that a company 
could be ‘essentially at home’ outside of its state of incorporation or principal place of business, but 
provided no example for lower courts”). 
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Goodyear subsidiaries were incorporated and headquartered elsewhere, 
they were not at home in North Carolina and thus lacked the continuous 
and systematic business contacts required to permit North Carolina 
courts to hear a cause of action arising outside North Carolina.41  The 
Court held that the entrance of the Goodyear subsidiaries’ tires into 
North Carolina through the stream of commerce did not create general 
jurisdiction because the subsidiaries were not at home in North 
Carolina.42 
The second case in the trilogy continued Goodyear’s restriction of 
general jurisdiction.  In Daimler AG v. Bauman, twenty-two Argentinian 
residents sued a German corporation in California seeking damages for 
acts committed by the corporation’s Argentinian-subsidiary in 
Argentina.43  The Argentinian plaintiffs sought general jurisdiction in 
California over the German corporation based on the distribution of its 
products in the state by a U.S. subsidiary incorporated in Delaware with 
its principal place of business in New Jersey.44 
The Court rejected California’s exercise of general jurisdiction 
because the German corporation did not incorporate or hold its principal 
place of business in California.45  Even assuming the U.S. subsidiary’s 
California contacts were attributable to the German corporation, those 
contacts did not make the German corporation at home in California.46  
The Court repeated Goodyear’s domicile standard that general 
jurisdiction requires affiliations with a forum “so ‘continuous and 
systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at home in the forum 
State.”47  The Court confirmed that this meant a corporation could only 
be subject to general jurisdiction in its state of incorporation and 
principal place of business.48  However, the Court reserved the 
possibility of an “exceptional case” arising where a corporation could be 
subject to general jurisdiction outside its state of incorporation and 
principal place of business but did not elaborate further.49  The Court 
                                                            
 41.    Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 929. 
 42.   Id. 
 43.    Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 120–21 (2014). 
 44.    Id. at 121. 
 45.   Id. at 138–39. 
 46.   Id. at 136 (“Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and further 
to assume MBUSA’s contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be no basis to subject 
Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler’s slim contacts with the State hardly render 
it at home there.”). 
 47.    Id. at 139 (quoting Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919). 
 48.    Id. 
 49.    Id. at 139 n.19. 
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ultimately held that because the German corporation was neither 
incorporated nor headquartered in California, and therefore not at home 
in California, California courts could not exercise general jurisdiction.50 
The final trilogy case, BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell, confirmed that 
Daimler and Goodyear’s at home test applied to all state court assertions 
of general jurisdiction.51  The Tyrrell plaintiffs sued a Delaware-
incorporated, Texas-headquartered railroad in Montana state court after 
sustaining work-related injuries outside Montana.52  The plaintiffs argued 
that Montana state courts had general jurisdiction based on the railroad’s 
in-state business activities, while the railroad countered that general 
jurisdiction could not be based on those contacts because the railroad 
was not at home in Montana.53  The Montana courts affirmed the 
exercise of general jurisdiction because the at home test did not apply to 
cases involving a defendant railroad or the plaintiffs’ particular injury 
claims.54 
The Court reversed Montana’s decision to exercise general 
jurisdiction as contrary to the at home test.55  The Court rejected the 
contention that Daimler applied only to specific types of claims against 
particular defendants, stating that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment due 
process constraint described in Daimler . . . applies to all state-court 
assertions of general jurisdiction over nonresident defendants.”56  
Because the railroad was not incorporated or headquartered in Montana, 
the railroad was not at home, and Montana’s exercise of general 
jurisdiction offended due process.57  Notably, the Court declined to 
consider an argument that the railroad consented to general jurisdiction 
in Montana by registering to do business there because the court below 
did not reach the issue.58  In other words, the Court left unanswered the 
question of whether consent-by-registration continues to satisfy due 
process. 
Justice Sotomayor’s Tyrrell dissent criticized the majority’s 
                                                            
 50.   Id. at 139. 
 51.   BNSF Ry. Co. v. Tyrrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558–59 (2017). 
 52.   Id. at 1554. 
 53.   Id.  The railroad operated 2061 miles of track in Montana, which comprised about 6% of 
its nationwide track mileage.  The railroad also had 2100 employees in Montana, which comprised 
less than 5% of its nationwide workforce.  The railroad additionally operated one of its twenty-four 
automotive facilities in Montana.  Id. 
 54.   Id. at 1554–55. 
 55.   Id. at 1558–59. 
 56.   Id. 
 57.   Id. at 1559. 
 58.   Id. 
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continued use of the at home test and deviation from International 
Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis.59  She argued that the at home test 
places significant burdens on individual plaintiffs: 
The majority’s approach grants a jurisdictional windfall to large . . . 
corporations that operate across many jurisdictions. . . . [I]t is virtually 
inconceivable that such corporations will ever be subject to general 
jurisdiction in any location other than their principal places of business 
or of incorporation. . . . [A] holistic, nuanced contacts analysis . . . has 
now effectively been replaced by the rote identification of a 
corporation’s principal place of business or place of incorporation. The 
result? It is individual plaintiffs, harmed by the actions of a farflung 
foreign corporation, who will bear the brunt of the majority’s approach 
and be forced to sue in distant jurisdictions with which they have no 
contacts or connection.60 
Justice Sotomayor also criticized the majority’s treatment of the 
“exceptional cases” reserved in Daimler.61  The majority appeared to 
limit the scope of the exception to the exact facts of Perkins, a limitation 
which would arguably “read the exception out of existence entirely.”62  
Instead of applying the at home test, Justice Sotomayor would have 
remanded the case to the Montana Supreme Court to determine whether 
the railroad’s contacts fit the “exceptional case” described in Daimler.63 
Altogether, the at home trilogy of Goodyear, Daimler, and Tyrrell 
effectively replaced International Shoe’s minimum contacts analysis 
with a formulaic at home test based solely on the state of incorporation 
and principal place of business.  The trilogy decisively narrowed the 
scope of corporate general jurisdiction and left lingering questions 
regarding the continued validity of once widely recognized jurisdictional 
practices.  One such practice is consent-by-registration.  Having traced 
the evolution of the Court’s general jurisdiction doctrine, the next section 
examines business registration statutes, their use as a means of obtaining 
consent to general jurisdiction, and the split authority regarding the 
continued constitutionality of consent-by-registration after the at home 
trilogy. 
                                                            
 59.   Id. at 1560 (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Justice Sotomayor 
agreed with the majority’s conclusion that § 56 of the Federal Employee Liability Act did not create 
jurisdiction but disagreed with the majority’s application of the at home test and the decision to 
reverse the Montana Supreme Court instead of remanding to determine if the case fell under the 
“exceptional case” exception described in Daimler.  Id. at 1560, 1562. 
 60.   Id. at 1560–61 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
 61.   Id. at 1561–62. 
 62.    Id. 
 63.   Id. 
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B. Plaintiff Strikes Back: Consent-By-Registration 
Every state, by statute, requires foreign corporations to register 
before conducting any business in that state.64  Registration entails filing 
an application with the Secretary of State containing the name and 
address of a designated in-state agent for service of process.65  States 
which recognize consent-by-registration take the act of designating an in-
state service agent as the foreign corporation’s agreement that it may be 
subject to personal jurisdiction in that state.66  Pennsylvania’s long-arm 
statute, for example, expressly states that a corporation’s registration will 
be taken as consent to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania courts.67  The 
Pennsylvania approach is an example of explicit consent-by-
registration.68  Unlike Pennsylvania, most registration and long-arm 
statutes are silent on the issue of consent and speak only to service of 
process.69  Nonetheless, the courts of several states interpret their 
registration statutes to have the same effect as Pennsylvania’s express 
                                                            
 64.    Kansas, for example, requires that “[b]efore doing business in the state . . . a foreign 
covered entity shall register with the secretary of state.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931 (Supp. 2017).  
Section 17-7931(a)–(h) of the Kansas statute then lists all the information which a registering 
organization must include in its application for registration.  See generally Benish, supra note 8, at 
app. (providing an overview and citation to every state’s business registration statute and the 
consequence of registration in terms of personal jurisdiction).   
 65.   The Kansas registration statute requires that a foreign corporation’s application include 
“the address of the registered office and the name and address of the resident agent for service of 
process required to be maintained by this act.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7931(f). 
 66.   See generally Harrison, supra note 2, at 516–30 (describing the rationale of post-Daimler 
cases holding that corporate registration entails consent to general jurisdiction). 
 67.   Pennsylvania’s approach is an example of explicit consent-by-registration.  Pennsylvania’s 
foreign registration statute, 15 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 411(b)–(e) (Westlaw through 
2018 Sess.), simply lists the requirements of registering as a foreign business in Pennsylvania.  
However, the Pennsylvania long-arm statute explicitly states that registering to do business as a 
foreign corporation establishes consent by the corporation to general jurisdiction.  42 PA. STAT. AND 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5301 (West 2004).  The Pennsylvania long-arm statute says that “[t]he 
existence of any of the following relationships between a person and [Pennsylvania] shall constitute 
a sufficient basis of jurisdiction to enable the tribunals of [Pennsylvania] to exercise general personal 
jurisdiction over such person . . . and to enable such tribunals to render personal orders against such 
person.”  Id. at § 5301(a).  One of the relationships that follows the general provision in § 5301(a) is 
“qualification as a foreign corporation under the laws of this Commonwealth.”  Id. at § 5301(a)(2)(i).  
Pennsylvania is the only state with a statute that expressly conditions registration on consent to 
general jurisdiction.  See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1366–68. 
 68.   Sanders, supra note 34, lays out the basic difference between explicit and implicit consent-
by-registration.  Explicit consent-by-registration, like the scheme adopted in Pennsylvania, 
“explicitly condition[s] consent as part of the registration.”  Id. at 1334.  Implicit consent-by-
registration, on the other hand, occurs where a state’s courts “read in implied consent simply by 
virtue of a corporation registering within a state (harkening back to constructive consent based on 
fictional presence).”  Id. at 1334–35. 
 69.    See Benish, supra note 8, at app. 
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statute.70  These states have enacted implicit consent-by-registration 
schemes.71  After the at home trilogy, many plaintiffs turned to consent-
by-registration as an alternative means of obtaining general jurisdiction 
over corporate defendants.72  With these statutory schemes in mind, the 
remainder of Section II.B details the split among lower courts before and 
after the at home trilogy on whether consent-by-registration satisfies due 
process. 
1. Lower Court Split Before the At Home Trilogy 
The United States Supreme Court issued several opinions on 
registration and consent to general jurisdiction prior to International 
Shoe.  In the nineteenth century, the Court held that states could 
condition foreign corporate registration on consent to specific 
                                                            
 70.   See id. (collecting state registration statutes and cases interpreting these statutes to 
determine the jurisdictional consequences of corporate registration).  The Kansas Supreme Court, for 
example, has interpreted the Kansas foreign corporation registration statute as subjecting the 
applicant to general jurisdiction in Kansas.  Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 146 P.3d 162, 171 (Kan. 
2006) (interpreting a prior version of the Kansas registration statute).  The Kansas registration statute 
requires that a registration-to-do-business application submitted by a foreign corporation must 
include “the name and address of the resident agent for service of process” and also “an irrevocable 
written consent of the foreign covered entity that actions may be commenced against it in the proper 
court of any county where there is proper venue by the service of process.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7931(f)–(g).  Some commentators argue that the replacement of the old statute implicates the Kansas 
Supreme Court’s conclusion that the registration statute explicitly requires consent to general 
jurisdiction as a condition of doing business in Kansas.  See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1368 n.121 
(“The Kansas statute at issue in Merriman has since been repealed and replaced by section 17-
7931(a)(7).  This statute also does not explicitly state the jurisdictional consequences associated with 
registering to do business in Kansas.”).  However, the Kansas courts continue to accept the same 
interpretation of § 17-7931 as they did for the statute at issue in Merriman.  See, e.g., Kearns v. N.Y. 
Cmty. Bank, No. 115,470, 2017 WL 1148418, at *5 (Kan. Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2017) (per curiam) 
(interpreting the new registration statute as “provid[ing] a basis for Kansas courts to exercise general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations” (citing Merriman)). 
 71.   See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016) (discussing an 
interpretation of Connecticut’s statute which treats “mere registration and the accompanying 
appointment of an in-state agent—without an express consent to general jurisdiction—nonetheless 
suffic[ient] to confer general jurisdiction by implicit consent”). 
 72.   See Harrison, supra note 2, at 507–08 (“[W]ith the narrowing of . . . general 
jurisdiction . . . in Daimler, ‘the natural next step for plaintiffs is to seek other grounds for general 
jurisdiction, and the most obvious place to look . . . is in a state registration filing that designates a 
corporate agent for service of process.’” (quoting Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 6, 259–60)); 
Monestier, supra note 7, at 1358 (“[N]ow that plaintiffs will have a much harder time establishing 
general jurisdiction over defendants . . . a different ground of jurisdiction will most certainly take 
center stage: that of corporate registration.  Plaintiffs who are foreclosed . . . under the Daimler “at 
home” standard will recast their jurisdictional analysis and . . . premise general jurisdiction on a 
corporation’s act of registering to do business . . . .” (footnotes omitted)); Benish, supra note 8, at 
1610–11 (arguing that Daimler’s elimination of long-held bases of personal jurisdiction “spark[ed a] 
search for alternative means to establish general jurisdiction over foreign corporations” which 
resulted in consent-by-registration being “the go-to alternative to Daimler’s holding”). 
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jurisdiction.73  Then in Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia 
v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., the Court held that Missouri validly 
exercised personal jurisdiction on a cause of action arising outside 
Missouri on the basis of consent-by-registration.74  The Court cited 
Pennsylvania Fire four years later when it held that a state’s 
interpretation of its own registration statute determines the jurisdictional 
effect of registration,75 and again eighteen years later when it held that 
the voluntary act of registration constitutes “real consent” to 
jurisdiction.76  So at least before International Shoe, the Court 
recognized that a state could require consent to general jurisdiction as a 
condition of registering to do business in the state. 
Following International Shoe, the federal circuits split on whether 
the Court had invalidated the practice of consent-by-registration.77  The 
                                                            
 73.   See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882) (“The state may . . . impose as a condition 
upon which a foreign corporation shall be permitted to do business within her limits, that it shall 
stipulate that in any litigation arising out of its transactions in the state, it will accept as sufficient 
the service of process on its agents . . . and the condition would be eminently fit and just.  And such 
condition . . . may be implied as well as expressed.” (emphasis added)); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 
59 U.S. 404, 407–08 (1855) (same). 
 74.   243 U.S. 93, 94–95 (1917).  The plaintiff in Pennsylvania Fire sued a foreign corporation 
in Missouri on a cause of action not arising in Missouri and sought jurisdiction based on Missouri’s 
registration statute that required foreign corporations to appoint an in-state agent for service of 
process.  Id. at 94.  Missouri’s courts interpreted their statute as establishing consent to personal 
jurisdiction, even on claims not arising in Missouri.  Id. at 95.  Although the decision pre-dates the 
distinction between general and specific jurisdiction, courts today would consider this case a general 
jurisdiction case because the cause of action arose outside of the forum.  Specifically, the plaintiff’s 
claim involved buildings in Colorado that the plaintiff owned and the defendant had insured.  Id. at 
94.  The Court ultimately held that Missouri could exercise personal jurisdiction consistent with due 
process because the foreign corporation chose to do business in Missouri, and thus took “the risk of 
the interpretation . . . put upon [the state] by [Missouri’s] . . . courts.”  Id. at 96. 
 75.    Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 216 (1921) 
(holding that compliance with a registration statute and appointment of a registered service agent 
may not establish jurisdiction on causes of action arising outside the forum “[u]nless the state law 
either expressly or by local construction gives to the appointment a larger scope” (emphasis added)).  
See also, Harrison, supra note 2, at 511 (discussing Robert Mitchell as the Court “clari[fying] its 
holding in Pennsylvania Fire and explain[ing] that federal courts should first look to how state 
courts have interpreted state registration statutes to determine whether a corporation’s compliance 
with the statute grants . . . personal jurisdiction over the corporation”).  
 76.   Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 174–75 (1939).  Although 
Neirbo involved objection to venue and not personal jurisdiction, there is not any “reason why the 
same logic would not apply to the question of what amounts to ‘actual consent’ to personal 
jurisdiction.”  Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *8. 
(D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015). 
 77.    Compare Bane v. Netlink, Inc., 925 F.2d 637, 641 (3d Cir. 1991) (affirming general 
jurisdiction based on Pennsylvania’s consent-by-registration statute), and Knowlton v. Allied Van 
Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a foreign corporation’s compliance 
with Minnesota’s registration statute constituted consent to general jurisdiction in Minnesota in 
satisfaction of due process), with Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183–
84 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting general jurisdiction based on Texas’ registration statute on a theory of 
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Court in International Shoe first mentioned consent when describing 
what is now recognized as specific jurisdiction,78 and then again when 
discussing its prior cases as resorting to the “legal fiction that [a 
corporation] has given its consent to service and suit, consent being 
implied from its presence in the state through the acts of its authorized 
agents.”79  Two federal circuits after International Shoe held that 
consent-by-registration remained consistent with due process.80  Two 
other circuits expressed support for consent-by-registration, though 
neither expressly held that the practice met constitutional due process 
requirements.81  Four circuits had not issued opinions on consent-by-
                                                            
consent because “it would be violative of due process”), and Wilson v. Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 
916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to interpret compliance with Indiana’s registration 
statute as consenting a foreign corporation to general jurisdiction in Indiana because such an 
interpretation “cannot satisfy . . . the demands of due process” and would render the statute 
“constitutionally suspect”).  See generally Benish, supra note 8, at 1611 tbl.1 (providing a 
representation of the position taken in each federal circuit court of appeals and the cases that 
accompany those positions). 
 78.   326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945) (“‘Presence’ in the state in this sense has never been doubted 
when the activities of the corporation there have not only been continuous and systematic, but also 
give rise to the liabilities sued on, even though no consent to be sued or authorization to an agent to 
accept service of process has been given.” (emphasis added)).  
 79.   Id. at 318. 
 80.    Bane, 925 F.2d at 641 (finding personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania over a foreign 
corporate defendant registered to do business in compliance with Pennsylvania’s statute because 
“[c]onsent is a traditional basis for . . . jurisdiction long upheld as constitutional” and because the 
Pennsylvania statute “gave [the defendant] notice that [it] was subject to personal jurisdiction in 
Pennsylvania and thus it should have been reasonably able to anticipate being haled into court in 
Pennsylvania” (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Provident Nat’l Bank v. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Ass’n, 819 F.2d 434, 437 (3d Cir. 1987))’’; Knowlton, 900 F.2d at 1200 (holding that the defendant 
consented to general jurisdiction in Minnesota by registering to do business and appointing an agent 
for service of process because the Minnesota Supreme Court had interpreted the statute to give rise 
to general jurisdiction and because the practice was a “traditionally recognized and well-accepted 
species of general consent”); see also Benish, supra note 8, at 1612 (listing the approach taken by 
each Circuit before Daimler). 
 81.    In Spiegel v. Schulmann, for instance, the Second Circuit in a footnote expressed support 
for consent-by-registration.  604 F.3d 72, 77 n.1 (2d Cir. 2010).  The Second Circuit indicated that 
the contention that the defendant in the case was subject to general jurisdiction by registering to do 
business in New York “would have been sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.”  Id.  However, 
the Second Circuit did not consider that argument because the plaintiffs did not raise it before the 
district court.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit also signaled its support for consent-by-registration in a 
decision rendered a few months before the Goodyear decision.  King v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 
632 F.3d 570 (9th Cir. 2011).  In King, the Ninth Circuit agreed that a corporation’s registration to 
do business could be taken as consent to general jurisdiction but concluded that the Montana state 
courts interpreting the particular registration statute at issue in that case did not impute such an 
interpretation onto their statute.  Id. at 576–78 (holding that because Robert Mitchell instructed the 
court to look at the state’s interpretation of its registration statute and because Montana did not 
interpret their statute as “standing alone, subject[ing] foreign corporations to jurisdiction in Montana 
for acts performed outside of Montana,” Montana could not exercise general jurisdiction over the 
defendant).   
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registration before the at home trilogy,82 and at least three others rejected 
consent-by-registration arguments.83  In sum, before Goodyear, Daimler, 
and Tyrrell, the federal courts of appeals were split on whether consent-
by-registration constituted a valid basis for the assertion of general 
jurisdiction. 
2. Lower Court Trends During and After the At Home Trilogy 
 Although the at home trilogy never addressed consent-by-
registration, the trilogy nevertheless resulted in a discernable shift away 
from consent-by-registration in lower courts.  The vast majority of courts 
after Daimler hold that consent-by-registration offends due process under 
the new at home test and may no longer provide an independent basis for 
establishing general jurisdiction.84  A few courts, however, maintain that 
the Supreme Court never overturned Pennsylvania Fire’s sanctioning of 
consent-by-registration, and the practice therefore continues to satisfy 
due process even under the more rigid standards imposed by the at home 
trilogy.85  This section samples a few of the significant consent-by-
registration cases which account for the at home trilogy to demonstrate 
                                                            
 82.    The Sixth, Tenth, D.C. and Federal Circuits had not issued opinions on the issue of 
consent-by-registration before Goodyear.  See Benish, supra note 8, at 1611 tbl.1.  
 83.   Consol. Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a 
consent-by-registration argument because “[t]he casual presence of a corporate agent in the forum is 
not enough to subject the corporation to suit where the cause of action is unrelated to the agent’s 
activities” (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945))); Wilson v. 
Humphreys (Cayman) Ltd., 916 F.2d 1239, 1245 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that an interpretation of 
Indiana’s registration statute which found compliance alone created general jurisdiction “[could not] 
satisfy . . . the demands of due process”); Ratliff v. Cooper Labs., Inc., 444 F.2d 745, 748 (4th Cir. 
1971) (holding that registration and appointment of an agent for service of process under South 
Carolina law did not “tip the scale” in the plaintiff’s favor and giving that fact “no special weight” in 
the court’s minimum contacts analysis under International Shoe).  As some courts note, however, it 
is not clear that these courts were rejecting a consent argument.  See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal 
Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *9 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (“[N]one of [the 
three Circuit opinions] directly address the issue of consent—i.e., why compliance with such a 
statute could not, under any circumstances, amount to the kind of consent to jurisdiction referenced 
in Pennsylvania Fire, Robert Mitchell, and Neirbo.”).  
 84.    James M. Beck, 50 State Survey On General Jurisdiction Through Consent By 
Registration To Do Business: Putting Bauman and Baseball Back Together, DRUG & DEVICE L. 
(Dec. 18, 2017), https://www.druganddevicelawblog.com/2017/12/quasi-guest-post-50-state-survey-
on-general-juris 
diction-through-consent-by-registration-to-do-business-putting-bauman-and-baseball-back-together 
.html [https://perma.cc/MH3S-7RWE] (collecting cases after Daimler and concluding that “[t]he 
overwhelming number of state and federal decisions . . . shows an unmistakable trend against 
subjecting a nonresident defendant to a state’s general jurisdiction through registration for 
business”).  
 85.    See Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 765–70 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
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the trend towards the invalidation of consent-by-registration. 
The Second Circuit rejected implicit consent-by-registration in 
Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp.86  Brown concerned a challenge to 
Connecticut’s registration statute, which does not mention personal 
jurisdiction and speaks only to service of process.87  Because the 
defendant clearly did not fit the at home test, the plaintiff relied on the 
defendant’s registration as a foreign corporation to supply general 
jurisdiction.88  The Second Circuit declined to exercise general 
jurisdiction on the basis of the defendant’s registration to do business, 
concluding that interpreting Connecticut’s statute as requiring consent to 
general jurisdiction, where the text spoke only to service of process, 
violated the due process principles articulated in Goodyear and 
Daimler.89  Such an interpretation would subject corporations to suit in 
every state because every state has a registration statute requiring 
appointment of a service agent.90  Because Daimler rejected such an 
“exorbitant exercise” of general jurisdiction, that interpretation would 
violate due process.91  Therefore, the Second Circuit rejected the exercise 
of general jurisdiction in Connecticut on the basis of consent-by-
registration.92 
The Second Circuit exempted explicit consent-by-registration from 
its narrow holding interpreting Connecticut’s implicit statutory scheme.  
The court held only that the particular interpretation of Connecticut’s 
statute violated due process, an interpretation which implied consent 
from the text of a statute which itself said nothing about consent.93  
Throughout its opinion, the court emphasized that a case of explicit 
consent spelled out unambiguously in a registration statute would present 
a different issue.94  In fact, the Second Circuit dedicated an entire 
                                                            
 86.   814 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 2016).  
 87.    Id. at 622 (“[T]he terms of [Connecticut’s] registration and appointment statutes are 
unclear as to whether they purport to confer on the state’s courts the power to exercise general 
jurisdiction over duly registered foreign corporations.”). 
 88.    Id.  The Maryland-incorporated defendant maintained its principal place of business in 
Maryland and was thus not at home in Connecticut.  Id. 
 89.    Id. at 639–40. 
 90.   Id. at 640. 
 91.   Id. at 639–40. 
 92.    Id. at 641. 
 93.    See id. at 637 (comparing the interpretation of Connecticut’s registration statute by its 
appellate courts with the explicit language claiming consent to general jurisdiction in Pennsylvania’s 
long-arm statute). 
 94.   Id. at 637–41.  The court noted “[t]he Connecticut statute, in contrast [to Pennsylvania’s 
statute], gives no notice to a corporation registering to do business in the state that the registration 
might have the sweeping effect [of the corporation consenting to general jurisdiction].”  Id. at 637.  
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paragraph to distinguishing between Connecticut’s implicit consent 
scheme and the explicit statutory consent approach taken in other 
jurisdictions: 
Were the Connecticut statute drafted such that it . . . requir[ed] foreign 
corporations to consent to general jurisdiction, we would be confronted 
with a more difficult constitutional question about the validity of such 
consent after Daimler. . . . [S]ome of our sister circuits have upheld 
states’ determinations that . . . registration to do business constitutes 
consent to the exercise of general jurisdiction . . . . [I]t could be 
concluded that a carefully drawn state statute that expressly required 
consent to general jurisdiction as a condition on a foreign corporation’s 
doing business in the state . . . might well be constitutional.95 
Consequently, the Second Circuit in Brown clearly preserved the 
possibility of explicit statutory consent remaining a viable means of 
obtaining general jurisdiction even after the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
the narrow at home test. 
Shortly after Brown, the Federal Circuit also considered the issue of 
consent-by-registration in Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals Inc.96  Acorda involved both a general and specific 
jurisdiction argument, although the majority opinion only addressed 
specific jurisdiction.97  In a concurring opinion, Judge O’Malley 
concluded that the court need not reach the specific jurisdiction issue 
because the defendant consented to general jurisdiction.98  Judge 
O’Malley’s concurrence discussed Supreme Court cases affirming the 
defendant’s right to waive objection to personal jurisdiction and consent 
to suit in a forum as evidence of the continuing viability of consent.99  
The concurrence also argued that the Supreme Court never expressly 
overturned Pennsylvania Fire despite having numerous occasions to do 
                                                            
The Second Circuit also concluded, after examining Pennsylvania Fire’s continued use of Daimler, 
that “mere registration . . . without an express consent to general jurisdiction . . . would . . . subject 
[every corporation] to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered, and Daimler’s ruling 
would be robbed of meaning by a back-door thief.”  Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 95.    Id. at 640–41. 
 96.    817 F.3d 755 (Fed. Cir. 2016).  
 97.    Id. at 757 (affirming the district court’s finding of specific jurisdiction and “not 
address[ing] the issue of general personal jurisdiction”). 
 98.   Id. at 764–65 (O’Malley, J., concurring) (“The specific jurisdiction issue, which the 
majority exclusively decides, is a more difficult question . . . than the . . . continuing precedential 
effect of . . . Pennsylvania Fire . . . .”). 
 99.   Id. at 765–66 (“[B]ecause the personal jurisdiction requirement is a waivable right, there 
are a ‘variety of legal arrangements’ by which a litigant may give ‘express or implied consent to the 
personal jurisdiction of the court.’” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 
n.14 (1985))). 
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so.100  Judge O’Malley also found the absence of a discussion about 
consent-by-registration in Daimler significant because Daimler’s only 
reference to consent distinguished consent cases from the at home test.101  
Relying on Pennsylvania Fire and its progeny, Judge O’Malley looked to 
Delaware’s interpretation of its statute, which construed registration as 
consent, and argued that the defendant consented to general jurisdiction 
in Delaware by registering to do business and appointing an agent for 
service of process.102 
In addition to Brown and Judge O’Malley’s Acorda concurrence, 
several other lower courts have decided consent-by-registration cases 
after the at home trilogy.  The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits 
recently issued opinions on consent-by-registration,103 and the Second 
Circuit will decide another consent-by-registration case in the near 
                                                            
 100.   Id. at 768.  Judge O’Malley detailed the numerous occasions when the Court was faced 
with a chance to reject Pennsylvania Fire’s sanctioning of consent-by-registration, “[y]et each time 
the issue arose, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that registration statutes, mandatory for doing 
business, could confer jurisdiction through consent depending on the interpretation given to those 
state statutes by state courts.”  Id. (citing Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 
175 (1939); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Chatters, 279 U.S. 320, 329 (1929); Robert Mitchell Furniture 
Co. v. Selden Breck Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 216 (1921)).  Judge O’Malley also noted that even 
after International Shoe, the Court did not overrule Pennsylvania Fire.  Id. at 768–69. 
 101.    Id. at 769.  As Judge O’Malley pointed out, the Court’s sole mention of consent in 
Daimler potentially signals the continuing viability of consent-by-registration.  Id. (noting that 
Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), remains “the textbook case of general 
jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation that has not consented to suit in the 
forum” (quoting Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 129 (2014)). 
 102.   Acorda, 817 F.3d at 769–70.  When Judge O’Malley penned her concurrence, the 
controlling Delaware Supreme Court case interpreting the Delaware registration statute was 
Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988), which interpreted the statute as conferring consent 
to general jurisdiction.  Exactly one month after Judge O’Malley’s Acorda concurrence, the 
Delaware Supreme Court overturned its interpretation of the Delaware registration statute in 
Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016).  Cepec concluded that Sternberg’s 
interpretation of the Delaware statute as establishing consent to general jurisdiction was too far-
reaching and no longer comported with due process in light of Goodyear and Daimler’s at home 
standard.  Id. at 127–28.   
 103.    A Fifth Circuit panel in Gulf Coast Bank & Trust Co. v. Designed Conveyor Systems, 
L.L.C. declined to decide whether consent-by-registration offends due process because it concluded 
that Louisiana law does not require consent to general jurisdiction.  717 F. App’x 394, 397–98 (5th 
Cir. 2017).  The Fifth Circuit panel stated that it “need not decide [whether Pennsylvania Fire 
survived International Shoe]” because Pennsylvania Fire could only potentially apply where a “clear 
statement from the state court constru[es] the [registration] statute to require consent.”  Id. at 397.  
Because the panel found that Louisiana law, as evidenced by the text of the registration statute and 
decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court, did not expressly require consent to general jurisdiction, 
it rejected the consent-by-registration argument.  Id. at 397–98.  A Ninth Circuit panel also 
considered consent-by-registration of a California statute and rejected the practice in an unpublished 
opinion.  AM Trust v. UBS AG, 681 F. App’x 587, 588–89 (9th Cir. 2017).  And the Eleventh 
Circuit concluded Florida law did not establish consent-by-registration.  Waite v. All Acquisition 
Corp., 901 F.3d 1307, 1318–22 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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future.104  Federal district courts have also issued a plethora of consent-
by-registration opinions since the at home trilogy.105  In fact, federal 
district courts remain one of the few places where the plaintiffs’ bar has 
found success advancing consent-by-registration after the trilogy.106  But 
the judicial fight over consent-by-registration is not limited to federal 
courthouses and increasingly appears in state courts. 
State high courts have decided many consent-by-registration cases in 
the at home era.  The Delaware Supreme Court issued the most 
significant of these decisions in Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec.107  Cepec 
concerned a challenge to Delaware’s registration statute, which the 
Delaware Supreme Court previously interpreted as establishing consent 
to general jurisdiction.108  The court rejected its prior interpretation of the 
statute as an “unacceptably grasping” and “exorbitant” exercise of 
general jurisdiction because requiring consent to general jurisdiction 
would subject corporations to suit in many states.109  Permitting one state 
to adopt consent-by-registration would encourage others to adopt similar 
schemes, “exacting such a disproportionate toll on commerce [that] is 
                                                            
 104.    The Second Circuit will issue an opinion in an appeal from an order of the Southern 
District of New York in U.S. Bank National Ass’n v. Bank of America, N.A., No. 15 Civ. 8153 
(PGG), 2016 WL 5118298 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2016), argued, No. 16-3560 (2d Cir. Nov. 8, 2017). 
 105.   See generally Beck, supra note 84 (collecting recent federal district court decisions on 
consent-by-registration in all fifty states). 
 106.    See Ritchie Capital Mgmt., Ltd. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., No. 17–1664 (DWF/FLN), 
2017 WL 4990520, at *2 & n.2 (D. Minn. Oct. 30, 2017) (concluding that Costco’s registration with 
the Minnesota Secretary of State established consent to general jurisdiction and rejecting the 
argument that Tyrrell invalidates consent-by-registration because the Court declined to decide that 
issue); AK Steel Corp. v. PAC Operating Ltd. P’ship, No. 2:15-CV-09260-CM-GEB, 2017 WL 
3314294, at *4 (D. Kan. Aug. 3, 2017) (exercising general jurisdiction based on the defendant’s 
compliance with the Kansas registration statute, which the Kansas Supreme Court interprets as 
establishing consent to general jurisdiction, because Daimler did not explicitly overturn 
Pennsylvania Fire); Consol. Infrastructure Grp., Inc. v. USIC, LLC, No. 8:16CV472, 2017 WL 
2222917, at *10 (D. Neb. May 18, 2017) (holding that Nebraska’s registration statute established 
consent to general jurisdiction); Ally Bank v. Lenox Fin. Mortg. Corp., No. 16–2387(DSD/DTS), 
2017 WL 830391, at *2–3 (D. Minn. Mar. 2, 2017) (affirming general jurisdiction on the basis of 
Minnesota’s registration statute because “appointing an agent for service of process ‘gives consent to 
the jurisdiction of Minnesota courts for any cause of action’” even after Daimler (quoting Knowlton 
v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990))).  The federal district courts in 
Pennsylvania, the only state with an explicit consent-by-registration statute, have issued a number of 
opinions continuing to hold that consent-by-registration satisfies due process even after the at home 
trilogy.  See, e.g., Plumbers’ Local Union No. 690 Health Plan v. Apotex Corp., No. 16-665, 2017 
WL 3129147, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 24, 2017) (aggregating opinions from the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania continuing to hold that Pennsylvania’s explicit consent-by-registration statute 
comports with due process after the at home trilogy). 
 107.   137 A.3d 123 (Del. 2016).  
 108.    Id. at 133.  The Delaware Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of the registration statute 
permitted consent-by-registration.  See Sternberg v. O’Neil, 550 A.2d 1105 (Del. 1988). 
 109.    Cepec, 137 A.3d at 141–43 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014)). 
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itself constitutionally problematic.”110  The Delaware Supreme Court 
suggested that it could reach a different result if the statute explicitly 
conditioned registration on consent to general jurisdiction.111  But 
because the Delaware statute did not contain express consent language, 
the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately held that consent-by-registration 
violated due process.112  The Wisconsin, Missouri, and Illinois Supreme 
Courts also recently issued consent opinions, and all held that consent-
by-registration offends due process after the at home trilogy.113  These 
opinions clearly demonstrate a trend away from consent-by-registration 
in the state courts. 
Before Goodyear, Daimler, and Tyrrell, lower courts were divided as 
to whether a state could require a foreign corporation’s consent to 
general jurisdiction when registering to do business.  Lower courts after 
the at home trilogy increasingly reject implicit consent-by-registration as 
violating due process under the Supreme Court’s newly narrowed 
standards for general jurisdiction.  But few courts have addressed the 
continued viability of explicit consent-by-registration after the at home 
trilogy.  Having provided background information about general 
jurisdiction and consent, the analysis that follows argues that a state 
could expressly require submission to general jurisdiction as a condition 
                                                            
 110.    Id. at 142–44. 
 111.   See id. at 142 (“Nothing in the registration statutes explicitly says that a foreign 
corporation registering thereby consents to the personal jurisdiction of this state.  Nothing in the 
statutes explicitly says that by having to register in order to do any business in this State . . . that 
meant a foreign corporation was waiving any objection to personal jurisdiction for causes of action 
not arising out of the conduct in Delaware that gave rise to the registration requirement.” (quotations 
omitted)).   
 112.   Id. at 148. 
 113.   In Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., the 
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a challenge to Wisconsin’s registration statute, which required 
designation of an agent for service of process, but did not explicitly claim consent to general 
jurisdiction as a condition of registration.  898 N.W.2d 70, 76–77 (Wis. 2017).  The Wisconsin 
Supreme Court declined to interpret the statute as incorporating consent-by-registration because the 
statute itself spoke only to appointing a service agent and because consent-by-registration does not 
comport with the due process analysis of the at home trilogy.  Id.  
  The Missouri Supreme Court in State ex. rel. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Dolan 
similarly concluded that an earlier Missouri Supreme Court opinion, which suggested that 
Missouri’s registration statute required consent to general jurisdiction, offended due process.  512 
S.W.3d 41, 52–53 (Mo. 2017).  The Missouri Supreme Court confirmed its rejection of consent-by-
registration again later in the 2017 term.  See State ex rel. Bayer Corp. v. Moriarty, 536 S.W.3d 227, 
232 (Mo. 2017).   
  The Illinois Supreme Court also rejected consent-by-registration when interpreting its 
statute, which also did not contain any express consent language.  Aspen Am. Ins. Co. v. Interstate 
Warehousing, Inc., 90 N.E.3d 440, 447 (Ill. 2017) (holding that “the fact that a foreign corporation 
registered to do business in Illinois . . . in no way suggests that the foreign corporation has consented 
to general jurisdiction”). 
216 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 67 
of doing business in the forum, even after the at home trilogy. 
III. ANALYSIS 
With little chance of obtaining general jurisdiction over a corporate 
defendant in a forum outside the state of incorporation and principal 
place of business, plaintiffs’ reliance on consent-by-registration will 
likely persist.114  Thus far, the post-trilogy lower court cases mostly 
involve implicit consent-by-registration.115  But few cases address 
whether a state could explicitly condition registration on consent to 
general jurisdiction.  This part concludes that explicit consent-by-
registration comports with due process even after the at home trilogy.  
After examining the arguments relied on by courts invaliding implicit 
consent, Section III.A demonstrates the inapplicability of these 
arguments to explicit consent-by-registration.  Section III.B suggests that 
the Court never overturned its endorsement of consent-by-registration 
and argues that explicit consent continues to satisfy due process.  
Permitting an explicit consent-by-registration approach balances the 
Court’s desire to rein in exorbitant exercises of general jurisdiction with 
the fairness concerns of individual plaintiffs. 
A. Attack of the Courts: The Flawed Arguments Against Consent-By-
Registration 
Lower courts invoke a common set of argument when invalidating 
implicit consent-by-registration after the at home trilogy.  The arguments 
typically focus on the significant burdens placed on corporations when 
subjected to general jurisdiction in many forums.  Although reasonably 
applicable to implicit consent-by-registration, the applicability of these 
arguments to explicit consent is less apparent.  This section examines 
three arguments frequently forwarded by lower courts and argues that 
each argument would not apply to explicit consent-by-registration.  
Section III.A.1 considers the “slippery slope” position—the contention 
that adoption of consent-by-registration in one state encourages many 
                                                            
 114.    Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 6, at 258–60 (arguing that “[i]n the face of a significantly 
narrowed test for contacts-based general jurisdiction, courts will be faced with new requests for 
consent-based general jurisdiction” and that “plaintiffs will push for a broad interpretation of what 
constitutes a defendant’s consent to personal jurisdiction”); Sanders, supra note 34, at 1329 (arguing 
that because “litigants can no longer rely on general jurisdiction based on a power analysis for those 
corporations not satisfying Daimler’s ‘at home’ test,” litigants “must instead turn to consent to assert 
general jurisdiction”).   
 115.    See supra Section II.B.2. 
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states to adopt consent-by-registration.  Next, Section III.A.2 analyzes 
the argument that consent-by-registration encourages forum shopping.  
Finally, Section III.A.3 discusses lower courts exaggeration of the 
burdens placed on corporate defendants by consent-by-registration.  Each 
argument, although potentially applicable to implicit consent, does not 
apply to explicit consent-by-registration. 
1. Slippery Slope 
Many courts rejecting implicit consent-by-registration rely on a 
“slippery slope” argument.  The argument posits that: (1) every state has 
a registration statute; (2) many large corporations register and do 
business in every state; (3) one state adopting consent-by-registration 
will encourage others to adopt consent-by-registration; (4) thus, consent-
by-registration offends due process by subjecting corporations to general 
jurisdiction in every state.116  The cases invoking the slippery slope 
position demonstrate the argument’s inapplicability to explicit consent-
by-registration. 
The Delaware Supreme Court relied on the slippery slope argument 
in Cepec.  The court stated that interpreting its registration statute to 
require consent would encourage widespread adoption of similar 
interpretations of registration statutes in other states.117  Human 
experience, the court said, “shows that ‘grasping’ behavior by one 
[state], can lead to grasping behavior by everyone, to the collective 
detriment of the common good.”118  Put differently, if Delaware adopts 
consent-by-registration, then other states will follow their lead and also 
adopt consent-by-registration.  The court cited Daimler in support of this 
argument.119  However, Daimler does not support the court’s slippery 
slope argument. 
Daimler referenced “grasping” when discussing a practice which 
subjects foreign corporations to general jurisdiction in many states other 
than the state of incorporation and principal place of business.120  The 
                                                            
 116.   E.g., Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639–40 (2d Cir. 2016) (finding that 
an interpretation of Connecticut’s registration statute which included consent to general jurisdiction 
would “creat[e] precisely the result that the Court so roundly rejected in Daimler” because every 
state has a registration statute and therefore “every corporation would be subject to general 
jurisdiction in every state in which it registered”); Cepec, 137 A.3d at 125 n.1, 136, 142–44; Ambac, 
898 N.W.2d at 81 (quoting Brown, 814 F.3d at 640). 
 117.    Cepec, 137 A.3d at 142–44. 
 118.   Id. at 143 (citations omitted).  
 119.   Id. at 143 n.111 (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 138 (2014)).  
 120.   Daimler, 571 U.S. at 137–38. 
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Court was not, as Cepec suggests, claiming that states model the 
jurisdictional practices of other states.  Daimler rejected the theory that 
“doing business” in a state establishes general jurisdiction over 
corporations.121  The Daimler passage cited in Cepec simply states the 
Court’s legal conclusion that if a jurisdictional practice subjects a foreign 
corporation to general jurisdiction in every state, which the “doing 
business” approach did, then it is unacceptably grasping.122  Daimler did 
not state that it reached this legal conclusion because evidence suggested 
that states adopted “doing business” jurisdiction by considering the 
jurisdictional practices of their neighbor states; rather, the Court simply 
gave a name to practices which subject large corporations to general 
jurisdiction in every state: grasping. 
Cepec’s slippery slope analysis also conflates the existence of 
registration statutes in every state with the adoption of consent-by-
registration in every state.  Whereas every state requires registration of 
foreign corporations and appointment of a service agent, few states 
explicitly or implicitly claim consent to general jurisdiction as a 
consequence of registration.123  The court provides no evidence that one 
state amending or reinterpreting its statute to claim consent-by-
registration would tempt neighboring states to behave similarly.  In fact, 
for years most states have resisted the temptation placed upon them by 
the Delaware Supreme Court and have not implemented or reinterpreted 
their statutes when neighboring states enact consent-by-registration 
statutes.  As the hypothetical below illustrates, simple economics 
dissuade states without consent-by-registration from modeling a 
neighbor state’s decision to adopt the practice. 
Assume, for example, that neighbor States A and B have registration 
statutes requiring foreign corporations to appoint an agent for service of 
process.  State A amends its statute to explicitly require consent to 
general jurisdiction as a condition of registration.  Basic economic 
principles dictate that A and B compete to attract businesses to their 
states,124 making B unlikely to adopt A’s new consent-by-registration 
approach.125  By retaining its service-only statute, B can advertise itself 
                                                            
 121.    Id. at 139 (“If Daimler’s California activities sufficed to allow [general jurisdiction in 
California] . . . the same global reach would presumably be available in every other state . . . .”).  
 122.   Id. at 136–39 (noting that the plaintiff’s theory “appears to subject foreign corporations to 
general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state subsidiary or affiliate,” a proposition which 
would subject the defendant to suit in every state). 
 123.    See Monestier, supra note 7, at 1363, 1366–70. 
 124.    See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 279 (1985) (discussing why firms reincorporate in different states). 
 125.   See Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245, 259–63 
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as a more attractive market for foreign corporations to do business, free 
from the risk of lawsuits on claims unrelated to activity in B.  B’s 
friendly jurisdiction laws could “encourage firms to locate in-state, thus 
increasing employment and the tax base.”126  The foregoing economic 
incentives therefore diminish the risk that one state’s adoption of 
consent-by-registration will initiate a slippery slope. 
The Delaware Supreme Court’s own analysis concedes this point.  
The court noted that “if the cost of [foreign corporations doing business 
in Delaware] is that those foreign corporations will be subject to general 
jurisdiction in Delaware, they rightly may choose not to do so.”127  In 
other words, conditioning access to Delaware’s market on jurisdictional 
consent imposes a high cost on the corporation which exceeds the 
benefits of registration: the potential that the corporation will be sued on 
claims unrelated to its forum activity.  Therefore, companies would not 
want to do business in Delaware.128  If it is true that consent-by-
registration imposes such significant costs on corporations that it 
discourages registration in the first place, then presumably few state 
legislatures would adopt consent-by-registration.  Thus, the court’s 
conclusion that consent-by-registration would harm the business 
environment in Delaware undercuts its contention that many states would 
rush to adopt consent-by-registration if Delaware chose to do so. 
Other lower courts also rely on slippery slope arguments.  The 
Wisconsin Supreme Court, for instance, relied on the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning in Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp. when declining to read 
consent into the Wisconsin statute.129  The Brown court concluded that 
inferring consent from Connecticut’s statute created a result rejected in 
Daimler because every state has a business registration statute.130  As in 
Cepec, the Second Circuit conflated the existence of registration statutes 
with the widespread adoption of consent-by-registration.  Therefore, the 
slippery slope argument forwarded by these courts suffers from the same 
                                                            
(2014).  
 126.    Id. at 264. 
 127.    Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 142 (Del. 2016). 
 128.   The U.S. Chamber of Commerce also made this argument in its amicus curiae brief to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, reasoning that a nationwide system of consent-by-registration “would 
impose disproportionate costs on Delaware corporations . . . while producing no offsetting benefits.”  
Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellant and Reversal at 14, Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (No. 528, 2015). 
 129.    Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 
N.W.2d 70, 81 (Wis. 2017) (quoting Brown, 814 F.3d 619, 640 (2d Cir. 2016)).  
 130.   Brown, 814 F.3d at 640 (“If mere registration and the accompanying appointment of an in-
state agent . . . confer[red] general jurisdiction by implicit consent, every corporation would be 
subject to general jurisdiction in every state in which it registered . . . .”). 
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deficiencies as Cepec’s argument. 
The cases above demonstrate the flaws in the slippery slope position, 
as well as the inapplicability of the argument to explicit consent-by-
registration.  Enacting specific language would put corporations on 
notice of the consequences of registration and permit calculated 
decisions about where corporations decide to do business.  Additionally, 
the economic principles currently dissuading states from adopting 
implicit consent-by-registration apply equally to explicit consent.  The 
Supreme Court could accordingly accept explicit consent-by-registration 
without causing the “slippery slope” cautioned against by lower courts 
invalidating implicit consent-by-registration. 
2. Forum Shopping 
A second argument against consent-by-registration is that it increases 
forum shopping by increasing the number of available general 
jurisdiction forums.131  Professor Tanya Monestier, a proponent of this 
argument, defines forum shopping as the practice of litigants searching 
for the most advantageous or beneficial, yet inappropriate, forum in 
which to file suit.132  In Professor Monestier’s view, states with consent-
by-registration become havens for forum shoppers, a phenomenon that 
will only increase as plaintiffs search for new general jurisdiction 
                                                            
 131.   See, e.g., Davis v. Quality Carriers, Inc., Nos. 08–4533 (SRC), 08–6262 (SRC), 2009 WL 
1291985, at *6 (D.N.J. May 7, 2009) (quoting Landreville v. Joe Brown Co., No. 06-5568, 2008 WL 
910009, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 2, 2008)); Reynolds & Reynolds Holdings, Inc. v. Data Supplies, Inc., 
301 F. Supp. 2d 545, 551 (E.D. Va. 2004); Cepec, 137 A.3d at 146 n.122 (citing several law review 
articles on forum shopping by plaintiffs in support of the position that consent-by-registration 
offends due process after Daimler).  
  The forum shopping argument also appears frequently in amicus briefs filed by advocacy 
groups in consent-by-registration cases.  See Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States 
of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and Reversal, supra note 128, at 15 
(“Permitting general jurisdiction based on compelled consent . . . would destroy that predictability 
and dramatically increase Delaware corporations’ legal costs.  Plaintiffs seeking to bring lawsuits 
against Delaware companies would be able to engage in forum shopping, choosing where to bring 
suit not on the basis of where the underlying events occurred or where the defendant was located but 
on which jurisdiction they perceived as friendliest to plaintiffs.”); Brief of Coalition for Litigation 
Justice, Inc., and American Insurance Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant and in Support 
of Reversal of the Decision of the Trial Court at 7–14, Cepec, 137 A.3d 123 (No. 528, 2015) 
(advancing the consent-by-registration forum shopping argument in the context of asbestos personal 
injury and other mass tort cases); Amicus Curiae Brief of the Coalition for Litigation Justice in 
Support of Countrywide Home Loans’ Appeal of the Court of Appeals Exercise of General 
Jurisdiction at 3–5, Ambac, 898 N.W.2d 70 (No. 2015AP1493); Amicus Brief of Wisconsin 
Manufacturers & Commerce Ass’n & the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America at 
11–12, Ambac, 898 N.W.2d 70 (No. 2015AP1493). 
 132.   Monestier, supra note 7, at 1409–10. 
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theories after the at home trilogy.133  But even if consent-by-registration 
increases forum shopping, that does not explain why courts should reject 
consent-by-registration. 
Courts also overstate the consequences of forum shopping.134  In 
many respects, the American judicial system values and even encourages 
shopping.135  Federal diversity jurisdiction, for instance, “permits 
Congress to authorize forum shopping between state and federal court 
precisely to enable out-of-state parties to forum shop away from state 
courts.”136  Venue and jurisdictional statutes are other ways in which the 
American judicial system permits some discretion in plaintiffs’ choice of 
forum.137  Despite the many ways in which forum shopping is ingrained 
in the legal system, the legal community denounces the practice.138  The 
presumption against forum shopping raises significant concerns for how 
courts evaluate the burdens imposed on corporations by consent-by-
registration. 
For example, the Delaware Supreme Court’s description of the 
negative consequences of forum shopping in Cepec amounts to a single 
footnote citing five law review articles.139  Three of the articles were 
                                                            
 133.    Id. at 1410–12 (arguing that plaintiffs before Goodyear did not need to rely on consent-by-
registration given the availability of the broader “doing business” minimum contacts analysis from 
International Shoe). 
 134.    See Pamela K. Bookman, The Unsung Virtues of Global Forum Shopping, 92 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 579, 582–83 (2016) (“[C]ritics rarely offer specific explanations as to why global 
forum shopping should be so widely condemned.”).  
 135.    D ebra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 352 (2006) (“If forum 
shopping were indeed a devious, illegitimate, and unfair practice, one would expect the law to 
circumscribe the available forum options and would expect the Supreme Court to criticize the forum 
shopping practice.  But this is not the case.  The law regularly authorizes a choice between two or 
more legitimate forums, and the Supreme Court generally has recognized the validity of forum 
shopping, criticizing the practice only in one very narrow context.”); Bookman, supra note 134, at 
598–99 (noting that Erie “did nothing to address the incentives for forum shopping . . . between 
different U.S. states” and that “[o]pportunities for [this] kind[] of forum shopping flourish[es] under 
Erie”). 
 136.    Bookman, supra note 134, at 599. 
 137.   Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a 
Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 82–83 (1999). 
 138.    See Bassett, supra note 135, at 336–37 (“Despite the frequent availability of a choice in 
selecting a forum due to the existence of more than one lawfully authorized forum, ‘forum shopping’ 
is undeniably a pejorative term. . . . [A] United States Supreme Court Justice has denounced forum 
shopping as ‘evil.’  Congressional efforts to limit forum shopping . . . portray[] the practice as 
abusive, devious, and unethical. . . . Critics . . . charge manipulation, wrongdoing, and abuse by 
lawyers (invariably plaintiffs’ lawyers) to obtain a forum and substantive law to which they are not 
entitled.  Indeed, critics charge, so egregious and abusive is this behavior that sanctions should be 
mandated.”); Bookman, supra note 134, at 582 (discussing the “widely reviled” nature of forum 
shopping, and noting “[t]he Supreme Court speaks of the practice with great disdain, vowing to 
protect U.S. courts from it”). 
 139.    Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 146 n.122 (Del. 2016).  The court cited 
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published before the at home trilogy, and accordingly do not account for 
new restrictions on general jurisdiction which rein in forum shopping.140  
The first article is about transnational forum shopping, which the article 
argues places a litigation tax on large multinational corporations.141  
Legal scholars question the empirical support for the litigation tax 
argument,142 and note that the Supreme Court’s decisions in other areas 
already significantly reduce the risk of transnational forum shopping.143  
The second and third articles reference mass tort forum shopping and 
resolving mass tort claims in bankruptcy courts.144  Neither author 
quantifies the occurrence of forum shopping.145  Nor does either author 
account for recent opinions curbing mass tort forum shopping.146  Only 
                                                            
primarily Alan O. Sykes, Transnational Forum Shopping as a Trade and Investment Issue, 37 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 339, 339 (2008), Douglas G. Smith, Resolution of Mass Tort Claims in the Bankruptcy 
System, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1613, 1621 (2008), and Lester Brickman, Lawyers’ Ethics and 
Fiduciary Obligation in the Brave New World of Aggregative Litigation, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 243, 258 (2001); the court cited secondarily Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff 
Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 
468, 477 (2015) and Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 
467, 479–99 (2014). 
 140.    Brickman, supra note 139; Smith, supra note 139; Sykes, supra note 139. 
 141.   Sykes, supra note 139, at 339. 
 142.    See Arthur R. Miller, McIntyre In Context: A Very Personal Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 
465, 469 (2012) (condemning the vilification of the plaintiffs’ bar and discussing the “[b]ogus 
statistics” supporting the litigation tax argument). 
 143.    See Bookman, supra note 134, at 600 (“[T]he Court has strengthened the barriers against 
such suits by fortifying the presumption against extraterritorial application of federal statutes, the 
forum non conveniens doctrine, and a restrictive view of personal jurisdiction.  There is a judicial 
crusade against global forum shopping.”); Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping 
System, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2011) (conducting an empirical analysis of transnational 
forum shopping and concluding that “the forum shopping system has evolved and no longer 
encourages plaintiffs to file transnational suits in U.S. courts” and that “there actually has been 
less—not more—transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts over the last two decades”). 
 144.    Brickman, supra note 139, at 258 (contending that “forum shopping has become a 
prominent factor in accounting for increased class action filings”); Smith, supra note 139, at 1621. 
 145.   Smith does not argue that forum shopping, on the aggregate, occurs more frequently than 
in other historical periods.  Instead, Smith’s argument is that mass tort cases concentrate in a few 
plaintiff-friendly districts.  Smith, supra note 139, at 1621 (arguing that claims “have gravitated 
toward certain jurisdictions that plaintiffs believe are more favorable” and therefore the “bulk of the 
litigation has occurred in a handful of jurisdictions”).  
 146.    For example, the Court’s decision last term in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 
137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017), significantly narrowed the scope of specific jurisdiction.  Many legal 
commentators argue that the decision is a death sentence for mass tort forum shopping.  See Kara 
Kapke, High Court Limits Litigation Forum Shopping, NAT’L L. REV. (June 20, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/high-court-limits-litigation-forum-shopping [https://perma.cc 
/P76X-QNLB] (“[The decision] firmly curtail[s] the ability of out-of-state residents to forum shop 
for a favorable jurisdiction in mass tort litigation,” thus “slamming the door to mass tort forum 
shopping for out-of-state residents.”); Richard Levick, The Game Changes: Is Bristol-Myers Squibb 
The End Of An Era?, FORBES (July 11, 2017, 2:21 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richard 
levick/2017/07/11/the-game-changes-is-bristol-myers-squibb-the-end-of-an-era/#6c9819582e83 
[https://perma.cc/X7MT-GVDE] (“[Bristol-Myers Squibb] fundamentally changes the rules 
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the final two articles in the Cepec footnote attempt to empirically 
evaluate the occurrence of forum shopping.147  Yet neither article blames 
general jurisdiction or consent-by-registration for increases in forum 
shopping.  The Delaware Supreme Court cited these five articles to 
support its conclusion that courts should reject jurisdictional practices 
which encourage forum shopping, but none of these articles make a 
legitimate case against forum shopping. 
Presumably, fears about increased litigation costs supply the bulk of 
courts’ concerns with forum shopping.  Yet empirical data does not 
support the contention that personal jurisdiction contributes to higher 
litigation costs: 
While it is intuitive to assume that it is significantly more expensive . . . 
to litigate out-of-state, this assumption is not well-founded.  There are 
no empirical studies documenting increased costs for out-of-state 
litigants, and conversations with lawyers suggest that . . . distance has 
little or no impact on litigation costs. . . .  When asked to quantify the 
cost difference between litigating in state and out-of-state, most 
lawyers . . . answered “less than two percent.”148 
Electronic communication and significant reductions in the cost of 
travel also decrease the effect of forum on litigation costs.149  Altogether, 
“the forum is unlikely to significantly affect overall litigation costs;” and 
even when it does, “personal jurisdiction rules may be relatively 
powerless to reduce overall costs.”150 
                                                            
governing where corporate defendants can be sued and effectively limits the forum-shopping that 
has driven ‘mass action’ lawsuits in the past.”); Richard Dean & Michael Ruttinger, How Bristol-
Myers Squibb May Transform Class Actions, LAW360 (October 11, 2017, 10:39 AM), 
https://www.law360.com/articles/973105/how-bristol-myers-squibb-may-transform-class-actions 
[https://perma.cc/Z6SA-ZPAR] (noting “high-profile dismissals from several jurisdictions” in the 
wake of Bristol-Myers Squibb); David R. Fine, In a Series of Personal-Jurisdiction Cases, the 
Supreme Court Gives Businesses Tools Against Forum Shopping, K&L GATES (June 21, 2017), 
http://www.klgates.com/in-a-series-of-personal-jurisdiction-cases-the-supreme-court-gives-business 
es-tools-against-forum-shopping-06-21-2017/ [https://perma.cc/248Z-FJYA] (“[T]he string of 
personal-jurisdiction cases from the Supreme Court might well provide ammunition to defend 
against forum shopping.”). 
 147.   Cain & Solomon, supra note 139, at 477; Myers, supra note 139, at 479–99. 
 148.   Klerman, supra note 125, at 250. 
 149.   Id. at 250–51.  Klerman argues that because almost all documentation in lawsuits today is 
stored electronically, “physical proximity to files is largely irrelevant.”  Id. at 250.  Additionally, 
Klerman points out that “since most communication these days is done by phone, email, or 
conference call, whether the lawyer and the client are in the same city is unlikely to significantly 
affect total litigation costs.  In addition, the cost of travel, especially air travel, has dropped 
significantly in recent decades, while the cost of lawyer’s time has increased, so the cost of travel is 
generally insignificant” to overall litigation costs.  Id. at 250–51. 
 150.   Id. at 253–54. 
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Courts should not use forum shopping as a justification for 
invaliding consent-by-registration.  And at the very least, courts should 
account for recent efforts to rein in forum shopping in other areas when 
deciding consent cases.  And even if consent-by-registration increases 
forum shopping, courts should articulate why forum shopping should be 
avoided in the first place.  Consequently, the Supreme Court should not 
rely on forum shopping concerns when evaluating whether consent-by-
registration comports with due process. 
3. Corporate Burdens 
Courts often argue that consent-by-registration imposes significant 
financial and practical burdens on corporate defendants.  However, 
corporate burdens do not warrant the rejection of explicit consent-by-
registration for three reasons.  First, courts ignore the various procedural 
mechanisms that diminish any expense and inconvenience to corporate 
defendants caused by consent-by-registration.  Second, courts should 
balance corporate burdens with fairness concerns of individual plaintiffs.  
And third, explicit consent-by-registration significantly reduces 
corporate burdens. 
First, corporate defendants possess a vast arsenal of pre-trial 
procedural weapons capable of mitigating the burdens placed on them by 
consent-by-registration.151  Venue transfer protects against any general 
jurisdiction litigation burdens by permitting the defendant to second 
guess the plaintiff’s forum choice, even if the forum had personal 
jurisdiction.152  One study examining three million federal cases over a 
thirteen year period found that venue transfers reduced the plaintiff win 
rate “from 58% in cases in which there is no transfer to 29% in 
transferred cases.”153  Transfer thus benefits corporate defendants with 
resources exceeding those of their individual plaintiff counterparts.154  
                                                            
 151.   Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 156 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (identifying 
venue and forum non conveniens as mitigating “any resulting unfairness to large corporate 
defendants”); Borchers, supra note 29, at 138 (“[V]enue transfer and the common law doctrine of 
forum non conveniens give the defendant some opportunity to influence the choice of forum even if 
the plaintiff succeeds in establishing jurisdiction.”).  
 152.    Borchers, supra note 29, at 138.  
 153.    Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping, 80 
CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1507 (1995).  The decline likely occurs because transfers increase plaintiffs’ 
litigation costs, forcing them to accept lesser settlements, settle cases earlier, or drop the suit 
entirely.  See id. at 1514–15. 
 154.   See Roger Michalski, Transferred Justice: An Empirical Account of Federal Transfers in 
the Wake of Atlantic Marine, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1289, 1289–90 (2016) (“[M]any transfers benefit 
corporate defendants and adversely affect individuals whose cases are transferred far away from 
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Therefore, although jurisdiction initially favors the plaintiff, transfer 
“shift[s] the balance of litigation and bargaining powers” back in 
defendant’s favor, thereby “protect[ing] against inconvenient and 
unwelcom[e] forums.”155  One could argue that transfers burden 
defendants by increasing litigation expenses.  However, most transfer 
motions go uncontested and only marginally affect costs, and legal 
commentators may often exaggerate transfer expenses.156  In reality, 
venue transfers effectively balance out the burdens placed on corporate 
defendants subjected to suit in an inconvenient forum away from 
home.157 
The doctrine of forum non conveniens also provides particular 
protection against unfairness to multinational corporations, a harm 
cautioned against in Daimler and relied on by courts invalidating 
consent-by-registration.158  However, forum non conveniens already 
reduces that burden by allowing federal district courts to dismiss a case 
when a more convenient forum exists in a foreign country.159  Even 
before the at home trilogy’s narrowing of general jurisdiction, federal 
district courts used this doctrine aggressively to dismiss transnational 
litigation.160  Despite the Court’s concern for transnational forum 
shopping absent new restrictions on general jurisdiction, forum non 
conveniens already equips courts with the flexibility necessary to “deter 
international forum shopping while preserving the efficiencies of liberal 
jurisdictional rules for domestic suits.”161  Because forum non conveniens 
                                                            
their chosen forum. . . . [thus] tilt[ing] the litigation playing field in favor of institutional actors at the 
expense of individuals.”).  
 155.    Id. at 1314.  
 156.    Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 153, at 1529–30 (examining data on transfer motions in 
federal court and finding that few transfers are contested, and few receive hearings in court).  
 157.   When forum shopping plaintiffs select an unjust forum, “courts are transferring cases to 
more just courts, so that the decrease in the win rate reflects the fact that courts are stripping 
plaintiffs of unjust forum advantages.”  Id. at 1507. 
 158.    Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014).  
 159.   See 14D CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3828 (4th 
ed. 2013) (describing district courts’ ability to dismiss or stay a case under the forum non conveniens 
doctrine if the only “superior alternative forum” is a court in another country).  
 160.   Whytock, supra note 143, at 529 (examining data claiming that there is an explosion of 
transnational litigation in the U.S. and finding that “the current system is unlikely to encourage 
transnational forum shopping into U.S. courts” and that “U.S. district court judges aggressively use 
the forum non conveniens doctrine to dismiss transnational litigation”).  
 161.    Daniel J. Dorward, Comment, The Forum Non Conveniens Doctrine and the Judicial 
Protection of Multinational Corporations from Forum Shopping Plaintiffs, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. 
L. 141, 168 (1998).  Dorward also discusses the particular problems imposed by courts issuing due 
process restrictions on personal jurisdiction as compared to courts continuing to rely on forum non 
conveniens as a solution to transnational forum shopping.  See id. at 167–68 (cautioning against due 
process personal jurisdiction restrictions because those changes “would affect domestic as well as 
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moderates the occurrence of transnational shopping, courts should not 
give this much weight when considering the effects of consent-by-
registration. 
Second, the Supreme Court should not view arguments about 
fairness or burdens inflicted on corporations in a vacuum.  General 
jurisdiction is a single procedural cog in a larger civil litigation machine.  
It is therefore illogical to decry one aspect of the civil system as 
egregiously unfair to corporate defendants without also considering the 
fairness of the system as a whole.  Even if permitting consent-by-
registration tips the scales slightly towards plaintiffs, “other aspects of 
[the] system are distinctly pro-defendant and tend to counterbalance the 
pro-plaintiff attributes.”162  The litany of pro-defendant financial and 
procedural tools available to large corporations therefore offset whatever 
consequences emerge from widespread adoption of consent-by-
registration.163  And given the Court’s continuing restriction of specific 
jurisdiction,164 a marginal expansion of the scope of general jurisdiction 
would merely offset recent gains made by defendants and restore the 
jurisdictional balance upset by the at home trilogy. 
Courts should therefore consider the types of corporations even 
capable of subjecting themselves to suit in every state.  Every negative 
consequence of consent-by-registration described in this comment 
emanates from the same exaggerated fear: that some corporations will be 
subject to general jurisdiction in all or nearly all fifty states.165  The only 
                                                            
international litigation” and “[t]he current [personal jurisdiction] rules may be efficient for domestic 
litigation, for which forum shopping is less of a concern”).  
 162.    Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1688–89 (1990) (arguing 
that although forum shopping benefits plaintiffs, it would be a mistake to see that as a “deviation 
from some baseline of neutrality” because other pro-defendant aspects of the system balance out any 
unfairness).  
 163.   Id. at 1679–80 (listing removal to federal court, challenges to subject matter jurisdiction 
and venue, forum non conveniens, challenging manufactured diversity of citizenship, juror 
challenges, suing for declaratory judgment, and forum selection clauses as examples of defendants 
engaging in forum shopping).  
 164.   Leslie A. Brueckner & Andre M. Mura, The Supreme Court Puts Personal Jurisdiction on 
Trial, LAW 360 (May 22, 2017, 11:41 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/926482/ 
print?section=appellate.  Other aspects of the Court’s recent civil procedure cases additionally tip 
civil litigation scales in the defendant’s favor.  See, e.g., Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 6, at 210 
(highlighting more lenient summary judgment standards for defendants, enhanced expert witness 
evidentiary standards, and heightened pleading standards as “markedly influenc[ing] the course of 
civil litigation”).   
 165.    The slippery slope argument, discussed in Section III.A.1, posits that states will follow 
each other’s lead in adopting consent-by-registration, and eventually every state will adopt the 
practice to the detriment of commerce.  The forum shopping argument also relies on this logic, and 
as discussed in Section III.A.2, the defense bar argues that the ills of forum shopping occur when the 
plaintiff has a choice of many forums, allowing the plaintiff to pick a highly inconvenient one.   
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businesses capable of consenting to general jurisdiction in all fifty states 
are large national and multinational corporations registered and doing 
business in all fifty states.166  The burdens imagined by courts rejecting 
consent-by-registration, therefore, only apply to the world’s largest 
corporations, and it is “[p]recisely this type of defendant [who] is best 
equipped to protect itself against future legal action in an inconvenient 
forum.”167 
Finally, explicit consent resolves corporate litigation burdens 
potentially resulting from consent-by-registration.  The reason 
registration could burden foreign corporations in the first place is 
because state statutes do not mention personal jurisdiction and speak 
only to appointment of an agent for service of process.168  Although 
foreign corporations lack notice of the consequences of registration 
under an implicit consent scheme, the situation is different where the text 
of a registration statute explicitly notifies applicants of the consequences 
of registration, allowing them to make voluntary choices as to whether 
they wish to accept the risk of registering and subjecting themselves to 
general jurisdiction.169  When dealing with explicit consent, it is 
reasonable to charge registering businesses with knowledge of the 
consequences of compliance because of the sophistication of the entities 
involved: 
                                                            
 166.   G enuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 143 (Del. 2016) (noting that Delaware 
corporations “must operate in all fifty states and worldwide to compete”).  
 167.    Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, supra note 162, at 1691–92. 
 168.   See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 637 (2d Cir. 2016) (concluding that 
Connecticut’s registration statute did not provide a permissible means of establishing the defendant 
corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction because it gave “no notice to [the] corporation 
registering to do business in the state that the registration might have the sweeping effect” of 
claiming consent to general jurisdiction); Cepec, 137 A.3d at 138–42 (the Delaware Supreme Court 
could not read consent to general jurisdiction into the registration statute because “[n]otably absent 
[from a prior Delaware Supreme Court decision] was any reference to explicit statutory language . . . 
that suggested that by registering under § 371 and designating an in-state agent for service of 
process, the foreign corporation was thereby consenting to the general personal jurisdiction of 
Delaware” and because the registration statute, unlike the Delaware long-arm statute which explicitly 
references personal jurisdiction, contained nothing that “explicitly says that a foreign corporation 
registering thereby consents to the personal jurisdiction of this state”); State ex. rel. Norfolk S. Ry. 
Co. v. Dolan, 512 S.W.3d 41, 52 (Mo. 2017) (leaving open the possibility of a statute explicitly 
conditioning consent to general jurisdiction on doing business as a foreign corporation in Missouri, 
noting that “this Court finds there is no need to determine whether Missouri’s registration statutes 
constitutionally could condition doing business in Missouri on consent to general jurisdiction. . . . 
The plain language of Missouri’s registration statutes does not mention consent . . . nor does it 
purport to provide an independent basis for jurisdiction over foreign corporations that register in 
Missouri”); Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 
N.W.2d 70, 77 (Wis. 2017) (stating that the Wisconsin statute refers only to service of process, not 
personal jurisdiction, and rejecting an implicit consent argument similar to the one raised in Cepec). 
 169.   Harrison, supra note 2, at 540–41. 
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[C]orporations are more likely to be familiar with the laws of a state . . . 
than an individual defendant . . . . Some corporations are highly 
sophisticated companies with legions of . . . lawyers at their disposal 
for the express purpose of investigating every possible legal risk those 
companies face.  Obviously, for one of those companies it would be 
much easier to anticipate where it might be subject to jurisdiction when 
deciding where . . . to conduct business than it would be for an ordinary 
person . . . .170 
Because explicit consent puts these sophisticated private entities on 
notice of the jurisdictional consequences of registration, it allows them to 
choose whether they wish to accept these consequences.171  Therefore, 
registration statutes explicitly conditioning permission to do business in a 
state on the corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction in the courts of 
that state mitigates any burden imposed on the registering corporation. 
In conclusion, explicit consent-by-registration should survive an 
attack premised on the arguments most commonly used to invalidate 
implicit consent-by-registration after the at home trilogy.  The “slippery 
slope” argument fails because it assumes that every state will rush to 
adopt consent-by-registration, despite the existence of economic 
incentives to the contrary.  The forum shopping argument similarly fails 
as it is typically invoked without empirical evidence or an explanation of 
the extent to which personal jurisdiction contributes to forum shopping.  
And lastly, courts ignore the litany of procedural tools which reduce 
unfairness and inconvenience to corporations in defending lawsuits away 
from home.  When the Supreme Court resolves the issue of consent-by-
registration, it should avoid repeating these mistakes because how the 
Court goes about calculating the defendant’s litigation burdens is the 
essence of the due process inquiry.  If consent-by-registration does not 
really burden corporate defendants, then the practice may actually 
comport with due process under the at home test for general jurisdiction.  
The next section advances that position. 
B. Plaintiffs’ New Hope: Explicit Consent-By-Registration 
Lower state and federal courts face a jurisdictional paradox when 
confronted with the issue of consent-by-registration.  Although the 
                                                            
 170.   Cody J. Jacobs, If Corporations Are People, Why Can’t they Play Tag?, 46 N.M. L. REV. 
1, 22 (2016) (footnotes omitted). 
 171.   See id. at 22 n.131 (arguing that “a disproportionate number of major corporate CEOs——
and probably other officers——are lawyers themselves” (citing Michael Simkovic & Frank 
McIntyre, The Economic Value of a Law Degree 7 n.8 (HLS Program on the Legal Profession, 
Research Paper No. 2013-6), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2250585)). 
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Court’s recent cases limit general jurisdiction over corporations to the 
state of incorporation and principal place of business, the Court also 
never expressly overturned consent-by-registration cases which would 
permit general jurisdiction in places other than the state of incorporation 
and principal place of business.  This section offers a suggestion to 
resolve that paradox by arguing that consent-by-registration continues to 
satisfy the constitutional due process requirements of personal 
jurisdiction.  Rather than inconsistent with the at home test, consent-by-
registration fits squarely within the Court’s reasoning in adopting the test 
for general jurisdiction.  This section first argues that the Supreme Court 
never overturned Pennsylvania Fire, and the case therefore remains a 
viable basis for affirming states’ ability to adopt consent-by-registration.  
Second, this section contends that consent-by-registration actively 
promotes the policy goals of the at home trilogy of promoting 
predictably simple rules for general jurisdiction.  Because the Court 
resolved the issue one-hundred years ago, and because reaffirming the 
issue will promote the jurisdictional goals fashioned in the trilogy, the 
Court should confirm that consent-by-registration satisfies due process 
even after the at home trilogy. 
1. The At Home Trilogy Did Not Overturn Pennsylvania Fire 
The Supreme Court never overturned Pennsylvania Fire and 
continues to endorse consent-by-registration after the at home trilogy.  
Pennsylvania Fire held that a state’s decision to condition access to its 
market on a foreign corporation’s consent to general jurisdiction 
comports with due process.172  The Court affirmed Pennsylvania Fire’s 
holding four years later.173  And a few years before International Shoe, 
the Court again affirmed Pennsylvania Fire’s holding.174  Clearly then, 
the Court accepted the theory of consent-by-registration at least up until 
International Shoe, and the only question is whether its subsequent 
decisions overruled Pennsylvania Fire.175  This section argues that the 
                                                            
 172.    Pa. Fire Ins. Co. of Phila. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 95–96 (1917). 
 173.    Robert Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U.S. 213, 215–16 (1921) 
(denying personal jurisdiction in Ohio because that state’s registration statute did not expressly 
require consent to general jurisdiction and the Ohio Supreme Court had not interpreted the statute as 
requiring consent to general jurisdiction).  
 174.   Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 175 (1939) (citing Pa. Fire’s 
holding in concluding that a corporation waived its ability to contest venue by complying with a 
New York registered agent statute, which the New York Court of Appeals had interpreted as consent 
to suit in New York). 
 175.   See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *6 
(D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (When confronted with the question of whether “one of the ways in 
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Court did not overturn Pennsylvania Fire in International Shoe or any of 
its other subsequent personal jurisdiction cases.  This section also 
responds to arguments that the Court in International Shoe and its 
progeny implicitly overturned Pennsylvania Fire.  Because the Court on 
numerous occasions declined to explicitly overturn Pennsylvania Fire 
when it otherwise could have done so, consent-by-registration remains a 
viable means of obtaining general jurisdiction over corporations. 
The Court’s personal jurisdiction precedent after International Shoe 
and before the at home trilogy did not overturn Pennsylvania Fire’s 
approval of consent-by-registration.  Yet many courts contend otherwise 
in cases rejecting consent-by-registration, arguing that International Shoe 
implicitly eliminated consent-by-registration.176  The Court decided 
Pennsylvania Fire, they argue, in an era where states could only exercise 
judicial power over entities “physically present” within their territory, 
and thus states extracted consent to jurisdiction out of a necessity to hold 
foreign corporations amenable to suit.177  That is, the foreign 
corporation’s registration made them “physically present” in the state 
and thus the state’s courts could exercise personal jurisdiction over 
them.178  International Shoe thus “dispensed with [this] ‘purely fictional’ 
notion[] of implied consent and presence-by-agent, and redirected 
personal jurisdiction doctrine away from the territorial approach.”179  
These courts additionally argue that the Court in Shaffer v. Heitner180 
made known its intent to overturn its pre-International Shoe personal 
jurisdiction cases, and thus the Court implicitly overturned Pennsylvania 
Fire.181  Because the Shaffer Court concluded that “all assertions of state-
court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth 
in International Shoe and its progeny,”182 these courts evaluate consent-
by-registration under a post-International Shoe analysis and conclude 
that Pennsylvania Fire no longer applies.183  For these reasons, many 
courts conclude that Pennsylvania Fire has been implicitly overturned 
                                                            
which . . . consent can be manifested is when a corporation complies with a state registration 
statute,” the court concluded that “prior to International Shoe, the Supreme Court’s answer to [that] 
question was ‘yes.’”). 
 176.   See, e.g., Genuine Parts Co. v. Cepec, 137 A.3d 123, 138 n.78, 142 n.103 (Del. 2016). 
 177.   See Brown v. Lockheed Martin, 814 F.3d 619, 631–33 (2d Cir. 2016).   
 178.   See id. 
 179.   Segregated Account of Ambac Assurance Corp. v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 898 
N.W.2d 70, 75 (Wis. 2017) (quoting Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 618 (1990)).  
 180.   433 U.S. 186 (1977). 
 181.   See, e.g., Cepec, 137 A.3d at 142 n.103 (citing Shaffer, 433 U.S. 186 at 212 & n.39). 
 182.   433 U.S. at 212. 
 183.   See Cepec, 137 A.3d at 142 n.103. 
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and that consent-by-registration no longer comports with due process. 
International Shoe’s language, however, refutes the proposition that 
the Court overturned Pennsylvania Fire and consent-by-registration.  
The Court addressed only cases of fictional consent, where a state took 
the presence of a foreign corporation’s employee in the state as the 
corporation’s “physical presence” and thus submission to jurisdiction.184  
The Court did not mention Pennsylvania Fire in International Shoe, and 
the Court did not expressly overturn its earlier approval of consent-by-
registration in subsequent cases.185  The lack of an express statement 
from the Court overturning Pennsylvania Fire should bind lower courts 
because only the Court may overturn its own decisions.186  The Court’s 
personal jurisdiction cases after International Shoe additionally refute the 
position that the Court no longer recognizes cases of consent.187  Indeed, 
“[i]n the almost 100 years since the Supreme Court decided 
Pennsylvania Fire, it has had ample opportunity to reconsider its 
holding.  Yet each time the issue arose, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
that registration statutes . . . could confer jurisdiction through 
consent . . . .”188  International Shoe itself can therefore not be read as 
overturning consent-by-registration. 
Moreover, Shaffer did not overturn Pennsylvania Fire.  Shaffer 
involved quasi in rem jurisdiction.189 As the Court later clarified, it 
intended to limit its statement in Shaffer that “all assertions of state-court 
jurisdiction” pass through International Shoe’s minimum contacts 
                                                            
 184.   See Forest Labs., Inc. v. Amneal Pharm. LLC, No. 14–508–LPS, 2015 WL 880599, at *4–
5 (D. Del. Feb. 26, 2015) (citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)) 
(explaining that the Court’s discussion of consent referred to cases where courts took the presence of 
a corporation’s agent in the state as consent to suit). 
 185.   See Acorda Therapeutics Inc. v. Mylan Pharm. Inc., 817 F.3d 755, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(O’Malley, J., concurring); In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 
WL 1047996, at *2 (D. Kan. Mar. 11, 2016); Forest Labs., 2015 WL 880599, at *7–10. 
 186.    Rodriguez De Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (“If a 
precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in 
some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, 
leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.”).  
 187.   See generally Syngenta, 2016 WL 1047996, at *2 (discussing a line of cases post-
International Shoe affirming the Pennsylvania Fire line of cases).  In Olberding v. Illinois Central R. 
Co., 346 U.S. 338, 341–42 (1953), the Court cited Neirbo approvingly in affirming venue in 
Kentucky through the defendant’s compliance with a business registration statute.  And in Insurance 
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 704 (1982), the Court 
affirmed the ability of the defendant to waive objection to personal jurisdiction and noted it had 
previously upheld certain state procedures which take the “voluntary use of certain state procedures” 
as “constructive consent to the personal jurisdiction of the state court.” 
 188.   Acorda, 817 F.3d 755, 768 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (O’Malley, J., concurring). 
 189.   Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 208 (1977). 
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analysis only to assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction.190  Shaffer did not 
apply its holding to cases of consent-by-registration, nor did it mention 
Pennsylvania Fire.191  Thus, the lack of explicit reference to 
Pennsylvania Fire again refutes the conclusion that Shaffer implicitly 
overturned consent-by-registration. 
Some courts maintain that even if International Shoe did not 
overturn Pennsylvania Fire, its subsequent cases, especially the at home 
trilogy, did.192  The at home cases, however, do not discuss, criticize, or 
even mention the Pennsylvania Fire line of consent-by-registration 
cases.  In fact, the sole mention of consent in these cases suggests the 
continued viability of the practice.  In Goodyear, the Court uses 
“consent” one time when referencing Perkins as the “textbook case of 
general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation 
that has not consented to suit in the forum.”193  The Court in establishing 
the at home test thus exempted its application to cases where a 
corporation consented to suit in the forum.  The Court cited that 
statement from its Goodyear decision again in Daimler, thus further 
distinguishing the application of the at home test from cases of consent, 
and “undermining any argument that the Court intended to speak to the 
issue of consent.”194  Consequently, not even the restrictive at home test 
adopted in Goodyear, Daimler, and Tyrrell overturns the 
constitutionality of consent-by-registration. 
                                                            
 190.    See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 620–21 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
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 193.    Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 926 (2011) (emphasis 
added) (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).  
 194.   In re Syngenta AG MIR 162 Corn Litig., No. 14-md-2591-JWL, 2016 WL 1047996, at *2 
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In short, the Supreme Court settled the issue of consent-by-
registration one hundred years ago.  Although decided in an era where 
the Court rationalized personal jurisdiction on notions of “physical 
presence,” Pennsylvania Fire remains a viable means of obtaining 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations.  The Court never explicitly 
overturned its holding in Pennsylvania Fire and its progeny, and its 
recent at home test does not preclude its application to courts considering 
consent-by-registration today.  As this section has shown, consent-by-
registration continues to satisfy due process because the Court has 
continuously affirmed the practice and declined to overturn Pennsylvania 
Fire. 
2. Explicit Consent Promotes the Due Process Principles of the At 
Home Trilogy 
Permitting consent-by-registration promotes the policy goals 
articulated by the Supreme Court in the at home trilogy.  The trilogy 
significantly narrowed the scope of general jurisdiction over foreign 
corporations and held that they may ordinarily be subject to general 
jurisdiction in their state of incorporation and principal place of 
business.195  The Court did not, however, limit the exercise of general 
jurisdiction over foreign corporations to these forums exclusively.196  In 
fact, the reasoning behind the Court’s narrowing of general jurisdiction 
to these forums also supports affirming consent-by-registration. 
The trilogy sought to promote simple jurisdictional rules which 
create predictable forums where corporations will be subject to general 
jurisdiction.197  A more predictable system is preferable because it 
permits “out-of-state defendants to structure their primary conduct with 
some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not 
render them liable to suit.”198  The Court recently affirmed its intent to 
craft predictable and simple general jurisdiction rules and confirmed that 
this intent applies to all state court assertions of personal jurisdiction.199  
Consent-by-registration furthers these policy goals and does not offend 
                                                            
 195.    Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 137 (2014).   
 196.    Id. at 137–38, 139 n.19 (discussing an “exceptional case” where general jurisdiction could 
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due process. 
Consent-by-registration promotes Daimler’s predictability concerns 
for general jurisdiction.  Large corporations are highly sophisticated 
entities armed with teams of lawyers charged with investigating legal 
risks faced by the company.200  These investigations naturally include 
decisions on whether to seek access to the markets of different states and 
the consequences and effects of registering to do business in different 
states.201  Small businesses, too, engage in these investigations as a 
matter of routine practice when making choices about where to do 
business.202  Consent-by-registration puts these corporations on notice 
and allows for voluntary choices about where to predictably subject their 
business to general jurisdiction. 
States with explicit language in their registration statutes extracting 
consent to general jurisdiction as a condition of doing business dispel 
any confusion and provide direct awareness to the sophisticated 
corporate defendant of the consequences of registration, making those 
corporations “more likely to be on notice of the implications of sending 
an officer to another forum to conduct business.”203  The corporation is 
additionally on notice because registration requires filling out and 
submitting documents which spell out the consequences of 
registration.204  This process allows foreign corporations the opportunity 
to make voluntary decisions about where they chose to subject 
themselves to suit.  If a corporation calculates that the risk of being 
subjected to suit on any claim in a state with explicit consent is too high, 
it may decline to register to do business there.  Or, it may accept that risk 
and register.  Whatever the case, the corporation makes the decision and 
will never be subjected to general jurisdiction in an unpredictable forum. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
After the “at home” trilogy, plaintiffs face a new reality.  Where 
before plaintiffs could rely on business contacts to subject a foreign 
corporation to general jurisdiction, now plaintiffs may only establish 
general jurisdiction in the state of incorporation and principal place of 
business.  And given the concurrent narrowing of specific jurisdiction, 
plaintiffs could find it difficult to locate a suitable forum without 
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incurring significant expense.  Although consent-by-registration 
potentially presents an alternative means of subjecting large corporate 
defendants to suit away from home, lower courts have thus far 
conclusively rejected consent-by-registration.  Because the 
overwhelming majority of the post-trilogy cases involve implicit 
consent-by-registration, courts have not resolved the issue of explicit 
consent-by-registration.  The case for explicit consent-by-registration is 
clear because the arguments against implicit consent-by-registration do 
not apply when a state expressly conditions registration on consent to 
general jurisdiction.  After the at home trilogy, explicit consent-by-
registration should provide plaintiffs with new hope of subjecting a 
corporation to general jurisdiction outside the place of incorporation and 
principle place of business. 
 
